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THESIS

**HASHEMITE SURVIVAL STRATEGY:
THE ANATOMY OF PEACE, SECURITY AND ALLIANCE
MAKING IN JORDAN**

by

M. Akif Kumral

June 2000

Thesis Advisor:

Co-Advisor:

Glenn E. Robinson

Ralph H. Magnus

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JORDAN**

M. Akif Kumral
Lieutenant, Turkish Land Forces
B.A., Turkish Military Academy, 1993


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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
Author:


M. Akif Kumral

Approved by:


Glenn E. Robinson, Thesis Advisor


Ralph H. Magnus, Co-Advisor


Frank C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

Peace, security and alliance making have all been important focuses of international relations and Middle East studies. The primary goal of this study is to address the general question about the likelihood and durability of peace with special reference to the pattern of inter-state behavior. In particular, this thesis examines the relationship between the "change in threat perceptions in regards to regime survival" and the "change in foreign policy" in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. More specifically, it gives special attention to the factors that determined the regime's alignment choice within the peace process.

Because of the rare nature of cooperation and the accepted normality of conflict in the Middle East, it is intuitively believed that peace, perhaps as its own reward, reinforces security by reducing the degree of threats to state survival. Jordan's peace case challenges this conventional wisdom. After the peace, Jordan simply eliminated the Israeli threat, realigned solidly with the U.S., and "balanced" the regional threats to its survival. Paradoxically, however, peace did not "omnibalance" the internal threats. In conclusion, the Hashemite survival strategy did not bring security to the regime because of both the existing domestic political predicaments and the reality of socioeconomic problems in Jordan.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Turkish Armed Forces or the Turkish Government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Hashemite Jordan is a small monarchy surrounded by formidable neighbors. Each country bordering the kingdom is either richer, militarily more powerful, or both. Therefore, the regime must constantly balance external forces in order to survive. It has to respond both to lethal regional conflicts like the Gulf War and to sudden shifts in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Moreover, Jordan must also straddle a domestic communal divide between Palestinians and Transjordanians, which has been a source of tension over the years. In the late 1980s, these tensions were exacerbated by the processes of economic reform and political liberalization.¹ The polarization of Jordanian society in the mid-1990s has created strong ramifications for regime security and the peace process.

Within this context, the death of King Hussein on February 7, 1999 could mark not only the end of an era, but perhaps also the end of Hashemite Jordan. According to some, the survival of the Hashemite regime cannot be taken for granted in the post-Hussein era. The possibility of the regime's fall in Jordan may well end the peace process and damage US interests in the Middle East.² In the eyes of many observers, the stability of the Hashemite regime is important not only because of Jordan's geographical significance but also because of its pivotal role in the Middle East peace process and the

¹ Rex Brynen, "The Politics of Monarchical Liberalism: Jordan," *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. 2, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 89-93.

² Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: U.S. Relations Bilateral Issues," (CRS Issue Brief, 2 January 1997). Available [Online]: <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/93-085.htm>>[22 February 2000]. Shibley Telhami, "The United States and Middle East Peace: The Troubled Assumptions," and Lawrence R. Velte, "The Middle East Peace Process and the U.S. Military," in Stephen C. Pelletiere, *The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Assessing the Costs of Failure*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997). Mary E. Morris, *New Political Realities and the Gulf: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).

region as a whole. As Jordan passes from the Hussein era to the Abdullah era, the delicate relationship between regime survival and the peace process still continues to be a question.

It will be the aim of my thesis to shed light on this fragile issue, by focusing on the external and internal environment surrounding the Kingdom before and after the peace. By focusing on pre- and post-peace circumstantial changes I will attempt to find answers to two main questions: Why did Jordan make peace with Israel? What did the peace bring for the Hashemite regime, external security or domestic instability or both?

I will argue that making peace with Israel constituted a “survival strategy”³ by the Hashemite regime in the face of both external and internal threats. Peace—the dependent variable—aimed to achieve regime survival—the independent variable—in Jordan. It was a deliberate calculation by the Hashemite regime to reduce the threats against its survival. Bluntly put, the “King’s peace” was a strategic attempt to “realign” with the U.S. after its “dealignment” during the Gulf War in order to establish regime stability in Jordan.

While considering internal threats, Hussein intended to balance mainly external threats by making peace with Israel. Simply, by eliminating the Israeli threat from the security equation, and getting solid political support and strong military assistance from the U.S., peace with Israel has reduced the external threats that might challenge the security of Jordan. Ironically, however, peace cannot eliminate—if not, it may

³ Daniel Brumberg, “Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World,” in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. 1, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 235. Brumberg specifically talks about political and economic survival strategies. For the sake of my argument, I treat this term more broadly to include foreign policy.

exacerbate—the sources of internal threats against the Hashemite regime. In the future, because of the existing political and socio-economic strains in the already fragile state-society underpinning, domestic instability may well endanger the regime's survival and thus the peace process itself.

The existence of both internal and external threats against the regime in the pre- and post-peace period makes Jordan a viable case to interpret the theory of "omnibalancing."⁴ According to this theory, the alignment behavior in the developing world can be explained not only by focusing on external threats but also by taking internal threats into account. More clearly, these regimes choose sides or omnibalances against threats to their survival.

For omnibalancing to be applicable, both external and *internal* threats to the leadership must exist...an even stronger test of omnibalancing is the case in which...the leadership aligns either based solely on the internal threats or on the role of the internal and external threats combined. In the Third World the decision-maker asks 'Which outside power is most likely to protect *me* from the internal and external threats (as well as combination of both) that I face?' 'How does this policy affect the probability of *my* remaining in power?'⁵

Omnibalancing does not ignore the conventional principles of international relations. Both peace and alignment are inter-state behaviors, and they do not exist in a vacuum. Omnibalancing accepts both the "Hobbesian" nature of international environment and the "Waltzian" analysis of causation in international politics: the

⁴ Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 1-11. Egypt, under Sadat, is the only Middle Eastern country taken as a case in this study.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-11.

individual, the *state*, and the *international system*.⁶ Moreover, omnibalancing necessarily includes the traditional—externally imposed, security based and militarily motivated—assessments of Middle Eastern type alignments.⁷

In addition, omnibalancing argues that alignments in the developing world cannot be understood without reference to internal threats. The key determinant of alignment would be the intensity of the threat to the leadership. In this case, the leaders balance against what they perceive as the principal threat. It does not matter for them whether the threat is external or internal. This is so because of the volatile nature of both foreign and domestic politics in the developing world. To put it another way, alignment behavior in these countries should be understood as a rational calculation of the leadership to ensure its political survival.⁸

As a research tool, omnibalancing helps to broaden the traditional notion of national security to examine internal factors rather than limiting itself to external arguments.⁹ It blurs the often overly-sharp conceptual divide between domestic politics and international relations behavior. By doing so, it goes deep into “the developing

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, (NY: Longman, 1997), 29-34. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979). According to Waltz, the first “image” looks for the explanations in particularities of individuals to understand the relationship between the personality of leadership and the inter-state behavior. The secondary image examines state—rational unitary actor—capabilities, national security strategies and the military doctrines as critical facets of inter-state behavior. The third image looks at systemic changes to understand the shifts in interstate behavior and defines international relations as the product of a complex interplay of local forces and global balance of power.

⁷ See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 13-17, 41-46, 148-154, 158-164. Walt reformulates the traditional balance of power theory, calling it the “balance of threat theory.” Walt reveals that the primary causes of alignment in the Middle East are “external threats.” He also asserts that the provision of “military aid is the major source, and perhaps the cause, of alliance behavior.”

⁸ David, 1-11.

⁹ For a revised notion of national security in the Arab World, see Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, (NY: St. Martins Press, 1993).

world security predicament.” Moreover, omnibalancing seems to be a very handy and applicable theory for understanding the foreign-domestic politics nexus of other Middle Eastern countries.¹⁰ In this sense, omnibalancing fits the theoretical framework, which is provided to analyze the foreign policies of Arab states.¹¹ At least for the foreseeable future, omnibalancing may well stand at the heart of area and security studies. Clearly, it provides not only a useful model for the studies of international relations but also a practical tool for comparative politics by bridging the gap between two disciplines.

Since its early existence, Hashemite Jordan had faced and suffered as many as, perhaps more, dangerous enemies from within, rather than from ambitious outside aggressors to its survival. In the case of Jordan, there is a strong linkage and an interesting triad among foreign policy of peace, inter-state behavior of alignment and domestic—political, military, and socio-economic—stability, or more correctly regime survival.¹² Given this fact, the traditional concepts are necessary but not sufficient to

¹⁰ For the most recent applications of omnibalancing theory in Middle Eastern cases, see Robert Olson, *The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998*, (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1998) and Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*, (London: Routledge, 1997).

¹¹ See for foreign policy analysis of Arab states, Ali E. Hillal Dessouiki, Bahgat Korany, “A Literature Survey and a Framework for Analysis,” in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouiki, *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 12-17.

¹² In fact, one should remember that the most dangerous episodes of regime crisis were highly similar in their nature. “The crises had two point of origin. The first was internal and related to the demands of Palestinians and some discontented East Bank Jordanians for a greater share of power. The second was external and was connected to the inter-Arab struggle among Egypt, Iraq, and Syria and of course with the problem of Western influence.” Abdullah—the first king of Hashemite throne—was assassinated in 1951 by a Palestinian nationalist, while he had been colluding between Britain and Zionist Jews over the partition of Palestine. Baghdad Pact debacle was King Hussein’s first survival test after assuming the Hashemite throne. Arab nationalists, who were supported by Egypt, strongly opposed British (informally the U.S.) offer of a pro-Western alliance. Even the ouster of the king was a possibility. First Nabulsi attempted to overthrow the Hashemite regime in 1956. Then a failed coup attempt came in 1957 by Abu Nuwar. The third crisis was the Black September of 1970. It was virtually a civil war between Palestinian nationalists, supported by Syrian Ba’thists, and the bedouin East Bankers. The monarchy barely survived. The last episode of Hussein’s survival story came with the Gulf Crisis. Again Hussein could not afford to join the pro-Western coalition by reading the strength of his subjects. This time, perhaps not coincidentally, largely Palestinian and Islamist opposition was to some extent under the influence of Baghdad. See M. E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995*, (NY: Longman, 1996), 291-300, 471-474.

understand the security triad in Jordan. For better or worse, this triad seems to be critical in defining the future of Jordan, as we know it, and by extension the future of the peace process.

A. UNDERSTANDING THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM: NATIONAL SECURITY AND ALLIANCE MAKING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

No sooner had King Hussein signed the peace treaty with Israel in October 1994, than his wish list of U.S. arms and military equipment was dispatched to Washington.¹³ He candidly explained the request: "Our problem is not one of a particular frontier...but all of them."¹⁴ In other words, Jordan feared Syria, Iraq and perhaps the new Palestinian entity. This would immediately induce a traditional Middle Eastern—externally imposed, security-based and militarily motivated—type of inter-state behavior of aligning against external threats.¹⁵

After the peace, Jordan would be declared as a major U.S. non-NATO ally, giving it the same status as Israel and Egypt. Jordan was included in the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, under which surplus U.S. military equipment is provided virtually free of charge to selected recipients.¹⁶ Peace with Israel would reduce the degree of a military threat and would bring long-awaited U.S. military aid. Hence the

¹³ *Middle East Economic Digest-Special Report: Defense*, 12 April 1996, 6-10.

¹⁴ *The Wall Street Journal*, 24 March 1995, p. A10.

¹⁵ Walt, 13-17, 41-46, 148-154, 158-164. According to Walt, "*balancing* is allying with others against the prevalent threat; *bandwagoning* refers to alignment with the source of danger." Walt argues that the great majority of alignments in the Middle East (from 1955 to 1979) were formed against external threats. According to his analysis "balancing was far more common than bandwagoning. States did not balance solely against power; as predicted, they balanced against threats. Offensive capabilities and intentions increased the likelihood of others joining forces in opposition. At least 93 percent (eighty out of eighty six) of the decisions were made at least partly in response to a direct regional threat and 87.5 percent (seventy out of eighty) were directed against the states that appeared most dangerous. By contrast, states chose to bandwagon with the principal sources of regional threat at most 12.5 percent (ten out of eighty) of the time."

peace could enhance the external security of Hashemite kingdom.¹⁷ Superficial analysis of these facts strengthens the classic explanations for peace.

Middle Eastern states traditionally act in a manner consonant with the realist model—seeking power and security in competition with the other states. Military force is the major instrument of state power in regional affairs. Every actor has to maximize its security. This explains continuously shifting and shuffling of alliances in the Middle East. A sense of insecurity permeates the region. Every state constantly focuses on external security. This is the major reason the governments and armed forces of the region have tended to be over ambitious in their arms-purchasing decisions.¹⁸

The realist model defines international relations as “politics in the absence of a common sovereign.” The international environment is “a realm of self-help where states face security dilemmas and force plays considerable role.” In the traditional paradigm, peace “looks different if only we can lift the veil of the balance of power.”¹⁹

To put in another way, since peace is an international behavior it can be explained by the basic concept of international relations, which is power. Clearly, international relations, either cooperation or conflict, are the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power. Not peace but survival is the principal—in some cases even the sole—goal of the state behavior. Power is ultimately the necessary means to achieve this goal. For this

¹⁶ Risa Brooks, *Adelphi Paper 324: Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, (London: The International Institute Strategic Studies, 1998), 31.

¹⁷ The U.S. guaranteed \$700-800 million in annual military funding after the peace. For a detailed discussion see U.S. Congress House Committee on International Relations, “Arms Transfers to Jordan and Consideration of the Committee’s Views and Estimates for the Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Resolution: Hearing and Business Meeting before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives,” 104th Cong., 2d sess., 13 March 1996.

¹⁸ Nye, 157. See also Yahya M. Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 154, 176.

reason, states are intensely sensitive to their relative power position. The distribution of power is important because it profoundly affects the ability of states to achieve what they perceive to be their security interests.²⁰

“Security is like oxygen. It is often taken for granted when it is present, but you will think about nothing else once you begin to miss it.” Security is a vital source of state behavior.²¹ Military power is the ultimate and necessary means to achieve external security. Military forces are incompatible in their coercive and deterrent capabilities. In other words, arms bring security and the state needs them to ensure its survival. Concisely put, a perfect correlation between military capabilities and state survival exists.²²

Since there is no single hierarchy of power in international relations, states are mainly concerned about their own security, and thus military calculations are hardly trivial for them. The reason is straightforward: the international political system is anarchic, which means that each state must always ensure its own survival. Since a state can have no higher goal than survival, when push comes to shove, military considerations and threat perceptions will be paramount in the minds of statesmen while deciding whom to ally.²³

²⁰ Robert Gilpin, “The Nature of Political Economy,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, ed., *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (NY: Harper Collins College Publishers Inc., 1996), 270-272.

²¹ Nye, 190.

²² “It is said that Winston Churchill once described Britain’s battleship building race with Germany before the First World War as ending with a curiosity. When the Admiralty demanded six ships, the economists offered four. They finally compromised on eight.” For this quote see, Hanan Bar-On, “Israel and Its Troubled Mediterranean Neighbors,” *Mediterranean Quarterly: A Journal of Global Issues* 8, no.2 (Spring 1997): 198. For a broader discussion, Gilpin, 271, 272 and John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” in Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven A. Miller, ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 361-366.

²³ John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” in Lynn-Jones and Miller, ed., 180-182.

Therefore, alliances are an integral part of the international security environment. They are sought by every state in order to enhance its power to protect and to advance its security interests. The principal function of an alliance structure is to define as clearly as possible the areas that states consider vital. Alliances are founded on the primary basis of shared security interests. In this sense, participation in alliances is commonly accepted as a critical facet of national security policy.²⁴

National security policy is a political-military, means-ends chain. It is a state-based theory about how a state can best secure itself. Military doctrines are critical components of national security policy. They are important because they affect the stability of the state's political system. Military doctrine is a response mainly to international influences. It represents the state's response to the constraints and incentives of the external world.²⁵

The objective of national security policy is to protect and extend national goals. The most fundamental goal is survival. Survival includes protection of the population, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. National security policy is largely a response to perceived threats in the international environment. The capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries determine the level of a threat. Powerful aggressors create a high level of threat and receive the most attention from policy makers. Therefore, the primary focus of national security policy is to counter military threats.²⁶

²⁴ Robert E. Osgood, "The Nature of Alliances," Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and Thomas J. Leney, ed., *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis*, (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), 63.

²⁵ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 38.

²⁶ Kaufman, McKittrick, and Leney, 6-8.

The military component of national security policy directly concerns the armed forces and the use of the military. There are two major components of military policy: *military strategy* and *force structure*. Military strategy is the result of evaluations within the national security system of factors such as national interests, the nature of the military threats to those interests, and the contribution of allies. The importance of the national interest, the degree of the threat, and the state's own capabilities combine to determine which action it will take and what specific type of policy it will use. Force structure and military strategy interact to produce a state's military posture. This posture must be able to respond to a wide variety of threats, from strategic nuclear war to low-intensity conflict. Force structure decisions determine the capabilities that will be available to implement the military strategy. They primarily deal with issues, such as arms acquisitions and weapon modernizations, which are vital for the survival of the state. So, the military doctrine has to respond to increasing adversary capabilities and keep up with the available military technology. It must also adapt to the changing political circumstances. If it is not sufficiently competitive in the dynamic environment of international politics, the survival of the state may be endangered. For this reason, the state has to minimize any negative consequences that accompany a military doctrine, such as the tendency of a defensive posture to create opportunities for piecemeal aggression.²⁷

In the absence of a higher authority, states exist in a condition of anarchy, i.e. their behavior is unregulated. As a result, states bolster their own defenses and they have to watch their neighbors carefully. The measures that the neighbors take to improve their

²⁷ Posen, 3-26.

security appear to make a state less secure. Countries that feel threatened have a strong incentive to increase their own power. At this moment, the mustering of military power is perhaps the most important task imposed on the state by the international political system. This being the case, states tend to focus on military capabilities. They take these capabilities at face value. States infer hostile intent from an offensive military doctrine. As the perception of an offensive military doctrine increases, the more insecure the other states in the system are likely to become. If one or more powers increase their capabilities by acquiring arms or building coalitions, then their neighbors will perceive a threat to their security. They will react by aligning or engaging in an arms race or doing both. All these steps become part of the state's survival strategy.²⁸

To put in another way, national security is a state-centered approach to survival. When this traditional notion is applied to Jordan's peace case, and its consecutive realignment with the U.S., the concept seems clear. At first glance, realistic and strategic explanations look impressive.

Jordan's original U.S. weapons arsenal was aging. For many years, the United States Congress, on the basis of Israel's security and further development in the peace process, had blocked certain advanced ground and air weapon deliveries to Jordan. For King Hussein, the end of the Cold War was not only the termination of the superpower rivalry in the Middle East but also the end of anti-communist exploitation and the Soviet military influence.²⁹ Additionally, Hussein's pro-Iraqi stance during the Gulf Crisis and the war was costly in terms of its strong and highly negative ramifications on U.S.

²⁸ Ibid., 35-40, 60-65.

²⁹ Helen Chapin Metz ed., *Jordan: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1989), 223-251.

military aid to Jordan. Under these circumstances, the monarchy strongly felt the need to change its dealignment policy. In order to enhance its external security Hashemite Jordan had to realign with the U.S., which would only be possible after making peace with Israel.

B. THE VALIDITY OF OMNIBALANCING: PEACE AND REGIME SECURITY IN JORDAN

Even from an international relations perspective, "the causes of peace lay not just in the configuration of international systems, but also in the internal structures of states that make them up."³⁰ "To explain outcomes one must look at the capabilities, the actions, and the interactions of states, as well as the structure of their systems... Causes at both the national and the international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable. The structure does not account for everything that happens in world politics."³¹ This is especially true and perhaps striking when one considers Jordan as a relatively weak state. Therefore, in order to better understand the causal factors affecting the Hashemite's decision to make peace, one should look at Jordan's domestic political, military, and economic structure.

In Jordan, not all foreign policy choices and moves are based primarily on national security considerations. External threats and military rationale have constituted the important part of Hashemite alignment policy, particularly in the peace process, there has always an inherent and "intimate relationship between foreign and domestic politics in Jordan."³² Moreover, King Hussein's foreign policy, even in crisis, flowed from his

³⁰ Gaddis, 360. The author refers to Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 8-12.

³¹ Ibid., 358. He refers to Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 174, 175.

³² Korany and Dessouki, 1-4.

“dynastic survival interests.”³³ Therefore, the high degree of continuity in several aspects of the Hashemite stance toward the peace process can also be explained by “regime security calculations.”³⁴

Here “regime security means how a leadership attempts to ensure its survival by foreign policy, of which alignment behavior is a subset. That is, given a state’s domestic structure, to what extent are leadership’s or a regime’s estimates of its security—including challenges to the domestic stability—is a source of foreign policy? What kind of issues might, by implication, constitute a threat, other than territorial integrity and political independence? None of this is to say that security considerations do not play a role in alliance behavior. “The only goals of alliances and alignments would be security related. But the only kind of security concerns would *not* be concluded are external and military in nature.”³⁵ “Political and socio-economic issues...may become military security issues as well.”³⁶

The threat must not be understood only in terms of an identifiable and, presumably punishable aggressor...Therefore...the traditional concept of security demonstrates to be inadequate to the concerns of a majority of the world’s states, leadership, and populations. In the developing, world states often face domestic security threats—riots, domestic insurgencies, military coups, civil wars, and the like. In such instances what is in fact in jeopardy is the regime, or more narrowly, the leadership, not the very existence of the country as an entity.³⁷

³³ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 369.

³⁴ Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 22-25, 306. While Brand persuasively observes only a slight distinction between “leadership and regime security,” she makes a careful analysis of the difference between “national security (defined in terms of preservation of territorial integrity and core values) and regime security (defined in terms of maintenance of power by the same leaders or ruling coalition).” She argues that “...failure to focus on the socioeconomic problems...may...challenge the regime (not necessarily or even primarily national) security.”

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 30, 295-299.

³⁶ Robert O. Keohane, “Hegemony in the World Political Economy,” in Art and Jervis ed., 292.

³⁷ Brand, 17-26.

In the inter-Arab scene several cases of alignment shifts of Hashemite regime appeared to have been related to regime security considerations. The role of domestic political economy had profound impact on Jordan's inter-Arab relations. Therefore, peace could well be intended to ensure the long-term survival of the regime. In very simplistic terms, peace would bring immediate benefits for the broke and virtually "aid addicted" monarchy.³⁸ Peace paid off handsomely when the U.S. forgave approximately \$700 million in loans.³⁹ This was, of course, in keeping with Hussein's foreign policy vision.⁴⁰

Yet, peace did not bring stability in Jordan. The monarchy still had to deal with a highly acute political and socio-economic crisis, which created largely Palestinian and Islamist domestic opposition to the regime, and by extension, to its policies in the peace process.⁴¹ Under these circumstances, traditional—purely military and external—considerations are not sufficient to explain the "security predicament" of the Hashemite regime.⁴²

Omnibalancing addresses this inherently unhealthy problem. In a particular way, it helps to diagnose, if not cure, the disease in Jordan by creating a linkage, or more

³⁸ Ibid., 30, 295-299.

³⁹ For a detailed discussion see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, "Arms Transfers to Jordan and Consideration of the Committee's Views and Estimates for the Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Resolution: Hearing and Business Meeting before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives," 13 March 1996.

⁴⁰ Available [Online]: <<http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/f-affairs/>> [17 February 1999]

⁴¹ See for a recent study on the socio-economic and political dimension of Islamist opposition to the peace process in Jordan, Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey, "Islam and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.42, no.5, (October 1998): 619-636. Available [Online]: <<http://proquest.umic.com/>> [8 November 1999]. In the case of Jordan "support for political Islam bears the highly significant and inverse relationship to support for Arab-Israeli peace." More importantly, "the explanatory power of political economy toward the peace process is also significant." In other words, "those who perceive themselves economically less secure express less support for the peace." For the Islamist-regime confrontation, see "Risk Pointers." [Available Online]: <<http://geopolitical.janes.com/regional assessments/eastern med/Jordan>> [22 November 1999].

⁴² Brand, 296.

correctly a triad between foreign policy, domestic politics and regime security. One of the most powerful determinants of foreign policy behavior in Jordan, particularly alignment decisions, was the “rational calculation” of Hashemites to “maximize their chances of survival.” King Hussein “determined his alignment behaviors in order to balance against the principal threats he faced. But this decision would necessarily include the consideration of internal threats. This was so because of the unstable, dangerous, and often fatal nature of international and domestic political environment” in Jordan.⁴³

Omnibalancing adequately describes, and perhaps predicts, the relationship between peace—foreign policy change or alignment shift—and regime survival in Jordan. It does not ignore either the international structure or the systemic changes. It just looks from a different angle to the external arguments. Both external and internal threats/changes matter for the Hashemites because they are extremely vital for their survival. Foreign and domestic concerns are key to understand the dynamics of regime security and the peace process in Jordan. In sum, omnibalancing gives a necessary and sufficient insight to comprehend all dimensions of survival in the Hashemite Kingdom.

In the following chapter I will analyze the external arguments by focusing on the structure within which the peace had occurred. I will lay out the historical dynamics of the peace process. My primary analysis proposes that the Hashemite regime made peace based upon the new opportunities created by the international system. The end of the

⁴³ David, 1-11. Interestingly, David argues that the leaders in the developing world “seek to split the alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous (domestic) opponents. To do this they appease their domestic opponents’ international allies. This superficially appears to be *bandwagoning* but is better classified as *balancing*. Finally, since the dominant goal of these leaders is to defeat the threats arrayed against them, they will sometimes protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants. Understanding why they align, therefore, requires focusing on the interest of the leadership over those of the state.”

Cold War and the Gulf War paved the way for the peace process to unfold with the Madrid Conference in October 1991. It was only after the Oslo Accords of September 1993 between the PA (Palestinian Authority) and Israel that Jordan could overcome its regional and domestic constraints. All of these external developments helped King Hussein overcome the long-time "prisoner's dilemma." Jordan could have never made peace with Israel had these changes not happened.

Additionally, in this chapter, I will explore the roots of military rationale or national security impetus behind the peace process. Practically, King Hussein's stance during the peace negotiations showed the strategic dimension of peace. More than anything, he was concerned with the degree of US security assistance. The Gulf War had made Jordan quite insecure. Furthermore, perhaps more than any time in its history, procurement of new weaponry for the military was critical for the survival of the Kingdom. In terms of U.S. military assistance, the costs of Jordan's dealignment during and after the war were heavy. Above all, the monarchy felt the dangers of bandwagoning with Iraq. From this perspective, peace aimed to achieve realignment with the U.S. in order to balance the external threats against Jordan.

Nevertheless, the traditional paradigm is necessary but not sufficient to comprehend all dimensions of regime security predicament. Political and economic rationalism has built a bridge between foreign policy and domestic security in Jordan. Therefore, by using the omnibalancing approach, in the third chapter I will look at the other "faces of security" in Jordan.

Before the peace process resumed, the Hashemite regime had started an unprecedented political and economic liberalization program in 1989. In the very early

course of opening, a strong Islamist opposition emerged as a political threat to the monarchy. Domestic opposition tested the omnibalancing ability of King Hussein during the Gulf War. The political dimension of internal threat proved to be real and very serious for the Hashemite regime survival strategy. Furthermore, the salience of political Islam increased with the developments in both democratization and the peace process. Consequently, King Hussein had to balance the democratization in an unconventional way in order to pursue the peace process. This would become contradictory to the very common, widely accepted and positive correlation between the level of democracy and the quality of peace.

The implementation of economic austerity measures, which had been mandated by the International Monetary Fund, became another stumbling block for the regime stability and peace in Jordan. Deterioration of economic conditions resulted in consecutive public uprisings and riots in 1989, 1996 and then in 1998. The political economy of Islamism created strong and negative implications for regime security. In the post-peace era, failure to address socio-economic problems might well put Hashemites survival in jeopardy. In this case, peace—change in foreign policy or alignment behavior—*per se* would not decrease the degree of internal threat against the regime. Ironically, however, it might increase the already existing fuel of Islamist opposition.

Adding to the political and socio-economic impasse, the Hashemites have also found themselves in a very critical identity dilemma after the peace. Peace represented an alignment with Israel at the expense of Jordan's Arab identity. More clearly, Jordan could not make peace with Israel and remain "Arab" in its identity. Unlike the severing of ties with the West Bank in 1988, the decision to make peace enormously challenged

the communally divided Jordanian society. Peace deepened the political boundaries and cleavages and raised a sharp dichotomy between national identity, if not state, and regime interests. Clearly put, the identity crisis brought about by peace weakened the Hashemite legitimacy.

Under these circumstances, the importance of political-military stability in Jordan turned out to be really critical for the regime's survival. Closely related to this issue were the problem of succession and the factor of personal legitimacy in the monarchy. Hussein's personal abilities and leadership style had very much enabled the dynasty's survival, especially in the last decade. He became not only the longest surviving leader in the Middle East, but also he was one of the few proponents of "warm peace." Moreover, as being among a few men shaping the "high politics," Hussein's "political whim," which is mostly associated with his military background, provides key information for the succession regime in Jordan. Most important, the central role of king in elite cohesion may also give, at least some, clues about the post-Hussein era.

To conclude, Jordan had experienced dramatic challenges of both domestic and foreign policy in the last decade. Peace must be seen as part of the Hashemite survival strategy to reduce both external and internal threats to the security of Jordan. Externally, Hashemite Jordan is stronger than ever. On the other hand, the post-peace regime seems to be weaker internally. In Jordan, regime security, and the peace process for that matter, can also be challenged by domestic opposition. Therefore, both external and internal threats must be taken into account to provide a broader and a more useful base to describe, explain, and predict the relationship between regime security and alignment behavior. Put another way, the key to regime stability in Jordan still rests largely upon

the king's ability to constantly omnibalance countervailing external and internal threats as the peace process proceeds.

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II. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL IMPERATIVES: THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF PEACE

Unlike some other parts of the world, the Middle East has remained a region where the traditional logic of inter-state behavior is still applicable. Therefore, it has always been problematic to disregard the realist view of international relations in the Middle East.¹ Even in the case of peace, realist precepts—military threats and strategic calculations—have been prevalent explanations of inter-state behavior. Jordan could hardly be an exception to the rule. As one high-ranking military official said, threats to Jordan's security originated from all "360 degrees of the compass."² In other words, Jordan has been surrounded by neighbors who were both suspicious and hostile. King Hussein has described Jordan as, "a very special kind of country that depends on good neighbors for its existence...and what would happen to Jordan if it remained friendless while those around it quarreled?"³ The kingdom had a very acute security dilemma requiring a definitive solution. It had not many alternatives other than keeping up with the changes in external environment to maintain its survival. Hussein had also been aware of the need to make peace with Israel for providing a speedy, and perhaps complete, external security.

In this realm, the end of the Cold War was not only a major change in the international system but also a big shock for all regional states including Jordan. The *insecurity* of states within this regional climate was reinforced by the Gulf War. External

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, (NY: Longman, 1997), 50, 176, 181.

² As quoted in Edward B. Atkeson, "U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East," in Benjamin L. Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, ed., *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 221, 222.

³ Hussein, King of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, (New York: Bernard Geis, 1962), 104.

threat perceptions dramatically increased for each and every state in the Middle East. As a result Jordan had to change its national security policy in a new international and regional environment. In this chapter I argue that Jordan's decision to make peace with Israel emerged from these two important external changes. Had these changes not happened, Jordan would not likely have shifted its alignment and changed its foreign policy in the peace process.⁴

Here, my analysis is straightforward. With the end of the Cold War and of the Gulf War, structurally there was little question that Jordan would make its way toward peace. Again, there were simply "no other options."⁵ Moreover, in order to sustain at least a defensively effective military doctrine, Jordan desperately needed the U.S. military aid that had been blocked for many years due to a further progress in the peace process. In sum, King Hussein rushed to the peace to realign with the U.S. in pursuit of providing external security. This was essential for the survival of the Hashemite kingdom.

Stated differently, the significant change in the international system created by the end of the Cold War forced Hashemite Jordan to reconsider its survival strategy. The United States remained the only superpower. The Gulf War provided a brutal confirmation that harsh issues of survival were an ever-present peril. As a consequence, Hashemite Jordan had to rely on itself, typically by arming itself to protect its interests or joining alliances in pursuit of national security.⁶ "Crises have a considerable effect on

⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, (London: IISS, 1991), 84, 85.

⁵ Robert J. Lieber, "The American Role in a Regional Security Regime," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Regional Security Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 59-80.

⁶ Lieber, 59-80.

national security calculations. They can cause extensive reassessments that will produce significant policy changes. They may bring into focus new relations among issues, or raise the importance of one interest, thus leading to changes in national security policy.”⁷ Nevertheless, the primary “national interest”⁸ in Jordan remained intact before and after the crises. It has been survival.

King Hussein believed that the kingdom could be secure externally, only with the establishment of a peace. Yet he was reluctant to make peace because of the constraints posed by the inter-Arab scene. In a certain way, the Oslo Accords helped him to overcome this stalemate. Four years after the Gulf War, which had caused a dealignment from the U.S., with the peace agreement Hashemites restored their strategic—“Janus-like or Jekyll-and-Hyde”—relationship with the United States.⁹ In this context, peace was strategically motivated. The declining readiness of the military before the peace was apparent. This became a real challenge for Hussein. Having reconsidered Jordan’s alignment policies and military capabilities, the monarch changed his foreign policy orientation in the peace process.

⁷ William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967-1976*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 28-35. See also William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 1-21.

⁸ For a very detailed analyses of “national interests,” see Donald E. Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 1-35.

⁹ Robert B. Satloff, “The Jekyll-and-Hyde Origins of the U.S.-Jordanian Strategic Relationship,” in David W. Lesch ed., *The Middle East and the United States: Historical and Political Reassessment*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 114-124.

A. THE COLD WAR AND AFTER: DEALING IN ARMS AND A SEARCH FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The Middle East was the ultimate strategic arena for superpowers during the Cold War. Regional alliances were part of superpower rivalry. The alliance membership served to draw the line beyond which the superpowers were prepared to resist each other's expansion.¹⁰ Opposition to Soviet influence was the primary motive of the U.S. Middle East alliance policy. Military aid has been used as a means of reinforcing alliances and defending regional interests. As President Eisenhower put it, "military assistance was for the common purpose of opposing communism."¹¹

During the Cold War, U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East were preventing Soviet dominance, assuring the flow of oil, and securing Israel. In this sense, because of its geographic location, Jordan has been important for U.S. alignment policies. Its closeness to critical sea and air routes has also constituted a significant interest of the United States. Jordan has been a logical area for bases, staging posts and a convenient focal point for military activity.¹² This has long been recognized and formed the strategic rationale for continued U.S. interests in the survival of Hashemite Jordan.

King Hussein was well aware that the stability of Jordan had been important for the security of Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as a whole. Despite these realities, in the first years of his reign Hussein was faced with the brutal fact that Jordan had "no justification and no future as a State." Nonetheless, "he understood the value of

¹⁰ Daniel J. Kaufman, Jeffrey S. McKittrick, and Thomas J. Leney, "National Security Policy: The Diplomatic and Economic Dimensions," in *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis*, (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1985), 340-342.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 154.

¹² Gershon R. Kieval and Bernard Reich, "The United State," in Bernard Reich, ed., *The Powers in the Middle East: The Ultimate Strategic Arena*, (NY: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 58-60.

being a 'buffer state' that weakness could be a commodity, and he played that very well."¹³ The key to his strategy was to take actions that would shape U.S. decisions in favor of lending strategic support to Jordan.¹⁴ So he was able to invoke U.S. political and military support in the crises of 1957 and 1970 by capturing the advantage of anti-communist rhetoric of the Truman and of the Eisenhower Doctrine.¹⁵

By the very nature of the Cold War, the superpowers were thoroughly ready to balance against each other. Consequently, the superpower rivalry was exploited by even weaker states, like Jordan. For Hashemite Jordan, the question was not "which superpower had been stronger?" but rather "which had been most willing to help?" Interestingly enough, despite Jordan's weakness, King Hussein had very often attempted to shift Jordan's alignment to obtain the most benefit out of the Cold War.¹⁶

Regionally, however, from the beginning of his reign, Hussein's position of being pro-Western in the continuing struggle between the Arab states and Israel had kept him in the forefront of political uncertainty. He had to deal with the preeminent strategic drawback of sharing a longer border with Israel than any other Arab country. The need to guard and permanently patrol 400 miles of frontier with Israel presented problems for the Jordanian military. What happened on the Jordan-Israel frontier could affect the political equilibrium of the kingdom. The long border with Israel and the likelihood of

¹³ "King's 46-year Reign Saw Stability at Home," *The Baltimore Sun Company*, 8 February Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/(Jordan and Military and Cooperation and Arms Transfer). [16 February 1999]. See for the specific role of "buffer states" in international relations, John Chay and Thomas E. Ross ed., *Buffer States in World Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Satloff, 115-119.

¹⁵ Dore Gold, *America, the Gulf, and Israel: CENTCOM (Central Command) and Emerging U.S. Regional Security Policies in the Middle East*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 13-28. See also Mohammad Ibrahim Faddah, *The Middle East in Transition: A Study of Jordan's Foreign Policy*, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1974), 275-287.

¹⁶ Walt, 95-98, 128, 153-157, 162.

conflict have placed Jordan, in terms of military readiness, in the garrison state category *vis-à-vis* the Israeli nation-in-arms.¹⁷

To compound the unease generated by this long border, repeated Arab-Israeli wars demonstrated that Israeli forces always fielded vastly superior military capability. King Hussein had to consider Syrian military power as well. Like Israel's, Syria's military forces have vastly outmatched those of Jordan. Furthermore, the regime in Damascus had frequently been at odds politically with Hussein. Jordan also has common border with Iraq. As a revolutionary Arab state opposed to settlement with Israel, Iraq was also a potential threat for the Hashemite regime.¹⁸

Jordan's basic military problem, given its inevitably inferior forces, was to find ways to protect its territory. Jordan has lacked the forces and air bases to put up with the air defense. No base in Jordan is more than three to twelve minutes by fighter from Israel or Syria. This is also an enormous vulnerability. The reasons behind King Hussein's force improvement strategies were clear. Such strategies would offer Jordan a real hope of being able to defend itself against Syria and the risk of a change in the regime in Iraq. It seemed likely that a strong and highly effective Jordanian Air Force and good air defenses of Jordan's northern air bases and vital points, would allow Jordan's army to contain even a large scale Syrian land/air attack. Similarly, Jordan might be able to deter an attack if Iraq came under a hostile regime.¹⁹

¹⁷ Helen Chapin Metz ed., *Jordan: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), 16-17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Jordanian Arms and the Middle East Balance*, (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1983), 46.

The fragile nature of Jordan's economic success depended on internal consensus. Access to both outside aid and outside capital are dependent on Jordan's ability to preserve internal unity and stability. They are mutually supporting. Aid makes it easier to maintain stability and stability increases the likelihood of aid. This cycle is directly tied to Jordan's ability to avoid military confrontation with its neighbors, especially Israel. Clearly put, the monarchy must avoid any conflict that might reopen the issue of "Jordanian vs. Palestinian" in all its forms.²⁰

Under these circumstances, the security of Hashemite Jordan had to rest on the military power. All of these factors combined to make Jordan adopt a defensive military doctrine. Its growing military weakness was also making Jordan a threatened power. This was the main motivation behind Hussein's ceaseless search for military assistance from the United States.²¹

The United States military assistance to Jordan began somewhat reluctantly on a small scale in the 1950s.²² The independence and integrity of Jordan had been declared "vital to U.S. national interests in 1957."²³ The United States became Jordan's source of military equipment following the termination of the British subsidy. The U.S.-Jordanian alliance was cemented with the approval of a \$10 million aid program.²⁴ A large-scale purchase of ground force equipment in 1965 was followed in 1967 by orders for F-104 Starfighter aircraft. After 1973 War with Israel, Hussein was determined to modernize Jordan's military capabilities. An improved air defense system had the highest priority.

²⁰ Ibid., 38-51.

²¹ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 57, 114, 206, 207, 354, 523, 554.

²² Kieval and Reich, 100-109.

²³ Satloff, 121. He quotes from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.

²⁴ Ibid., 121.

The proposal for Jordan's air defense weapons resulted in protracted negotiations in Washington between the United States Congress and the executive branch. The pro-Israeli domestic forces put strong pressure on Congress to reject the sale. Their main argument was that Israel would be vulnerable to the combined offensive weapons coverage of Syria and Jordan. Ultimately a compromise was reached under which the United States would place the air defense system permanently in defensive positions. A final agreement was reached on the US \$540 million arrangement in September 1976.²⁵

Not only did the negotiations over the air defense system prove humiliating to King Hussein, but also the system as finally negotiated did not fully meet Jordan's need. The coverage provided by the missiles was limited. The missiles were extremely vulnerable at fixed sites. In 1979, Jordan sought to acquire F-16 fighter aircrafts and M-60 tanks. The United States delayed in responding. Hussein turned to Britain for tank modernization and to France for Mirage aircraft as substitutes for the F-16s. In November 1981, because of the cancellation of the sale of 100 U.S. M-60 tanks, Jordan had to purchase Soviet equipment from the USSR.²⁶

Within the new U.S. "security framework" of 1983, Jordan was designated in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of US Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM needed access for exercises, prepositioning and bases to support a possible war. In this case, Jordan could offer the possible use of its territories in high intensity contingencies involving the USSR, and perhaps the use of its military manpower in more limited contingencies of intra-regional conflict. Despite the Arab-Israeli conflict, Jordan had sought to establish some kind of political-military consensus with the U.S. Jordanian

²⁵ Metz, 261, 262.

²⁶ Ibid., 23, 262.

Royal Defense Forces (JRDF) had pursued active political-military strategy with CENTCOM. But, in the fall of 1983, when it was revealed that the U.S. had been training a Jordanian strike force as part of a CENTCOM mission, Congress blocked the \$225 million in secret financing planned for equipment.²⁷ In early 1984, President Reagan's arms sale proposal was blocked by the congressional opposition. Congress blocked another transaction in 1985, which would include 40 F-16s. This time the Congress set the conditions on the peace process that King Hussein was unprepared to meet. In early 1986, the administration suspended indefinitely its efforts to supply major systems to Jordan.²⁸

Despite these setbacks, Jordan devoted between 14-21 percent of its GNP and 22-37 percent of its central government spending to national security during the 1980s. Jordan's military posture was defensive. Even though Jordan on its own would be unable to counter a full-scale Israeli attack, its military doctrine was based primarily on the possibility of conflict with Israel. The country also faced a long-term threat from hostile Syria. Nevertheless, Jordan's expenditure levels were about one-eighth of Israel during the same period and one-fifth those of Syria. Jordan retained sufficient capability to give an aggressively inclined neighbor pause, but it did not have the resources to keep pace with the buildup of modern arms. To put Jordan's military into perspective, in late 1988, its tank strength was only both 25 percent of Israel's (3,900) and Syria's (4,000). Although Jordan increased its total number of combat aircraft from 50 fighters in 1973 to

²⁷ Gold, 29-59, 58-76. The concept of security framework was first suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant for National Security Affairs of the Carter administration.

²⁸ Metz, 263.

109 in 1988, it still had only 16 percent of Israel's combat aircraft strength (676) and 23 percent of Syria's (478).²⁹

Therefore, the "strategic consensus"³⁰ with Washington was clearly in Amman's interest during the Cold War. By broadening security cooperation with the U.S., Hashemite Jordan could enhance its chances of survival in cases of intra-regional conflict. The formation of strategic consensus was not sufficient, compared to an alliance, for the advancement of Jordan's security interests. The peace settlement with Israel had been an absolute prerequisite for Jordan to solidly align with the U.S., and thus ultimately guarantee its survival in a highly volatile region. Unlike the ill-fated Baghdad Pact of 1956, peace would possibly bring a "pro-Western regional security system." Simply put, had the peace been built, Jordan would have reached its long-term goal—final stable peace based on integration into a regional security system.³¹

With the end of Cold War, the U.S. remained the paramount outside power in the Middle East.³² In this context, the end of superpower rivalry had also minimized the effects of Soviet military aid. The U.S. had the opportunity to monopolize its regional influence, as being the most powerful and modern arms producer, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moscow was in a decline as a superpower patron. The Soviet arms and military doctrine was defeated. The post-Cold War global balance of power created a favorable environment for the United States to resume the Middle East Peace Process.³³

²⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 287-292.

³⁰ Kieval and Reich, 83-85. This concept was first uttered by Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State in the Reagan Administration.

³¹ Gold, 84-104.

³² Lieber, 59-76. He refers to Kenneth Oye, "Beyond Postwar Order and New World Order," in Oye, Lieber, and Donald Rotchild, eds., *Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (NY:Harper Collins, 1992), 18, 19.

³³ Cordesman, *Jordanian Arm and the Middle East Balance*, 21.

After decades of superpower competition in the Middle East, the end of the Soviet Union has contributed catalyzing the new Middle East peace process. The emergence of the U.S. with its special relationship, as the region's dominant superpower, dealt a devastating blow to a military option against the U.S. interests. Clearly, every regional actor was advised to join the political process and play by American rules, in the hope of gaining at least a degree of their strategic goals.³⁴

Hashemite Jordan was no exception to the rule. This logic alone is more than enough to justify King Hussein's political commitment to achieve peace. He was eager to be a partner of the peace talks for strategic reasons, which were more directly related to Jordan's survival interests in a changing international system.

B. AFTER THE STORM: RUSHING TO PEACE

Saddam Hussein's August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait presented a "vital" case for all Middle Eastern States, including Jordan.³⁵ The Gulf War "created new sets of questions to be answered, tensions to be addressed, and problems to be resolved. It is within this atmosphere that conflict and peace existed side by side."³⁶

Seen through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the emergence of Iraq as a regional power and aggressive actor began in early 1990. The Gulf War produced a belated but determined effort by Saddam to link the Palestinian issue to any proposed resolution of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. In part because of his precarious domestic position, King Hussein was largely supportive of Saddam. Amman had begun gravitating towards the Iraqi orbit. Throughout early 1990, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continued to strengthen its military-operational collaboration with Baghdad.³⁷

³⁴ *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, 86.

³⁵ Donald E. Nuechterlein, *America Recommitted: United States National Interests in a Restructured World*, (KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 231.

³⁶ Lesch, 2.

³⁷ *Strategic Survey 1990-1991*, 84-86.

Concerned with the largely Palestinian and Islamist opposition at home, King Hussein was genuinely captivated by Saddam's forcefulness. Moreover, he perceived the Israeli formula of "Jordan is Palestine" as a long-term and more dangerous threat.³⁸ Economic problems left Jordan with no prospect of keeping up with Israel. There was no hope for a major source of outside military aid. Hence King Hussein reacted by allying himself with Iraq.³⁹ Under these circumstances, its position of weakness dictated that Jordan embrace, rather than oppose, the protection offered by Saddam. Having allowed the Iraqi photo reconnaissance flights along the Jordan river border in mid-1989, King Hussein then permitted tours of the border by Iraqi staff officers in 1990, and announced that joint air and ground units would be formed. By 1990, they conducted joint military exercises, and had even established a joint training squadron.⁴⁰

Regionally, Jordan was between Scylla and Charybdis. It was caught between Iraq and Israel and thus mobilized its armed forces. It transferred a number of troops from the east to the Jordan valley. This indicated that it considered the threat from Israel to be more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached, Jordan announced that it would protect its land and air borders against external aggression.⁴¹ Unlike Syria, which had the power to balance against Iraq by participating in the coalition, as a weaker state, Jordan reluctantly had to bandwagon with Iraq.

³⁸ For a detailed information on Jordan's encounters with both Israelis and Palestinians, see Ralph H. Magnus, *The Hashemite Connection: Current Issues in Jordanian-Palestinian Relations*, (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 1990).

³⁹ Cordesman, *After the Storm*, 287-289.

⁴⁰ *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, 84, 85.

⁴¹ Metz, xxi-xxxi.

"Wedged between more powerful, Israeli, Syrian, and Iraqi neighbors, King Hussein chose to side with the stronger Arab power."⁴²

The successful prosecution of the campaign against Iraq gave the U.S. new regional credibility and dedication of purpose. Thus, the end of the war created long-term implications for the peace process. The emergence of the U.S. as the dominant superpower over much of the region placed Washington in an ideal position to try to advance a new political process with highly explicit commitments.⁴³

In the Middle East...we seek to foster regional stability, deter aggression against our friends and interests in the region, protect...and safeguard our access to international air and seaways and the region's oil. The United States is committed to the security of Israel and to maintaining the qualitative edge that is critical to Israel's security...At the same time, our assistance to our Arab friends to defend themselves against aggression also strengthens security throughout the region including for Israel.⁴⁴

After the war, Jordan became strategically more important for U.S. security interests in the Middle East.⁴⁵ It also became essential for the peace process. From Israel's standpoint, Iraq's emergence as the primary Arab military power, coupled with its aggressive stance, enhanced the geostrategic importance of Jordan.⁴⁶ A stable Hashemite kingdom would serve as an effective buffer against any large-scale Iraqi conventional challenge to Israel on the ground. In contrast, a destabilized Jordan that moved headlong into a fully-fledged military alliance with Iraq would likely trigger the

⁴² Martin Indyk, "The Postwar Balance of Power in the Middle East," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Roger K. Smith ed., *After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War*, (Lanham, MA: Aspen Institute, 1992), 91-95.

⁴³ *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, 86-90.

⁴⁴ Lieber, 66. "The Pentagon's Revised Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-1999 Fiscal Years," as quoted from *The New York Times*, (May 24, 1992), 14.

⁴⁵ Gerald F. Seib, "The Need to Keep Regional Powers in Check," in Ted Galen Carpenter ed., *America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences*, (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1991), 83-93.

⁴⁶ *Strategic Survey 1990-1991*, 82.

reconstitution of an Arab eastern front. Hence, Israeli leadership that had caused Hussein great concern by their "Jordan is Palestine" formula, sought to reassure the King regarding Israel's commitment to Jordan's stability. At a minimum, the pattern of the war pointed to Jordan as Israel's strategic depth. This notion was reinforced by the repeated assertion that the Jordanian-Iraqi border was the "strategic red line."⁴⁷ It had never been the size of Jordan's army that most disturbed Israel, but its geography. Jordan's proximity to vital Israeli assets (airfields, industrial and population centers) caused considerable anxiety in Israel whenever Jordan had considered a change in military deployment. Israel always feared Jordanian territory would be used for the deployment of, or a passage for, the armies of an Arab military coalition. Peace would prevent Amman from slipping into either the Iraqi or the Syrian orbit.⁴⁸

After the Gulf War, not only did the Israeli strategic perspective change but also the ideology of Arab solidarity died.⁴⁹ As the fiction of Arab unity was finally destroyed and the old Middle East alignments were permanently changed, Hussein had now good reasons to fear from the Iraqi regime. Saddam could not promise security for Hashemite Jordan, and King Hussein realized, "Jordan was too small to stand alone."⁵⁰ By the end of the Gulf War, it was impossible for Jordan to continue bandwagoning with Iraq. As a consequence, Jordan had "to rely on itself, typically by arming to protect its interests or join a new alliance in pursuit of providing external security."⁵¹

⁴⁷ *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, 86-91.

⁴⁸ *Strategic Survey 1994-1995*, 130, 131.

⁴⁹ Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Gulf War and the Future of Global (and Arab?) Order," and Alexander George, "The Gulf War's Possible Impact on the International System," in Stanley A. Renshon ed., *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 295-299, 317-325.

⁵⁰ Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, 104. The King reports that "many of his officers believe the necessity of dynamic alignment to counter perceived regional threats."

⁵¹ Lieber, 59-80.

Inferior forces, insufficient defense resources, and external threats inevitably forced the Jordanian military planners to be extremely cautious. There was no doubt that military leaders, officers, and officials were keenly aware of their vulnerability and the potential cost of any large-scale conflict. They learned many lessons from the Iraqi failure in the Gulf War. At least at the top, they fully understood how easily Jordan could be devastated. Hashemite Jordan was in the middle of many of the strategic issues and dilemmas. Militarily, it has been caught up in all the problems effecting the confrontation between Israel and Syria. Jordan was too poor to compete in the Israeli-Syrian military buildup and too threatened not to. The Gulf War has shown that high quality weapons will dominate modern conflicts. Jordan desperately needed modern arms but had no major patron to turn to for support.⁵²

Consequently, Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War left Jordan without any major ally. Jordan's pro-Iraqi stance undercut years of friendly relations between Jordan and the West. U.S. aid was cut and FY 1990-1991 aid funds were blocked. The U.S. canceled joint exercises with Jordan in June 1992 because of claims that Jordan violated sanctions. Jordan began to suffer from severe shortages of spare parts, and its readiness declined sharply in 1991 and 1992. It was unable to modernize its air force and air defense. Jordan had to cancel an order for twelve Mirage 2000s and the modernization of fifteen Mirage F-1s. Jordan could only improve its relations with the U.S., and thus gain access to military aid, by agreeing to take part in the peace talks and to comply with the post war UN sanctions on Iraq.⁵³

⁵² Metz, xxi-xxxi.

⁵³ Cordesman, *After the Storm*, 287-289.

Militarily, Jordan could not cope with any kind of regional threat without changing its alignment with Iraq. The Gulf crisis and the war had showed that, as a dynamic concept, Jordanian national security policy must be revalidated according to the new regional environment. Peace was the most rational, effective, and formal way for Jordan to implement its national security policy.⁵⁴

Inter-Arab alliances had proven to be more risky and unpromising for external security than realigning with the West. King Hussein reconsidered Jordan's security strategy. Peace appeared to be the best way to achieve long-term interests. By signing a formal peace agreement, Jordan would harness a strong "regional security regime"⁵⁵ with Israel and could also realign itself with the only remaining superpower.

In this context, Hussein was eager for the historic peace conference, which convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991. But, the Washington talks between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians progressed along different lines. For Israel, Jordan appeared as a convenient partner for Palestinian autonomy talks. The assumption was that Jordan could conceivably collaborate with Israel in constraining the extent of Palestinian autonomy. Despite the Israeli willingness, King Hussein could not impose the Hashemite will on the Palestinians. The Palestinians were never happy with the partnership with Hashemite Jordan that had been forced upon them and wished to detach themselves to the greatest extent possible. Hussein, fearful of antagonizing his enemies in the inter-Arab scene, remained neutral. He insisted on prior progress in the Palestinian track before negotiating his peace with Israel. By early 1992, much had changed in the fundamentals

⁵⁴ *Strategic Survey 1990-1991*, 82.

⁵⁵ Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Security Regimes: Mediating between War and Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Inbar ed., 34. "A regional security regime is a formal agreement that aims to stabilize the strategic relationship between two adversaries to reduce the possibility of armed confrontation."

of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria had recognized the principle of direct talks with Israel. The Palestinians accepted the utility of progress through limited interim measures.⁵⁶

In the second phase of negotiations, the most dramatic advance came in the Jordanian-Israeli sphere. In late October 1992, King Hussein laid out the Hashemite agenda for peace. This placed him at the vanguard of the peace process. Nevertheless, he could not commit to a formal step that might draw excessive inter-Arab (especially Syrian) ire. Amman signaled that it could not move ahead of the inter-Arab consensus. Israel would have to make progress with the Palestinians, and to a certain extent with Syria, before Jordan could sign the peace treaty.⁵⁷

The "Declaration of Principles" was signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in Washington on 13 September 1993. The agreement confronted Jordan with a new situation.⁵⁸ The Declaration of Principles had diminished, or more bluntly unleashed, the Hashemites Palestinian dilemma. It also reflected the change in Jordan's foreign policy to act on its own survival interests with greater independence from the rhetoric of Arab solidarity. Only by taking the final step towards peace with Israel, would Jordan improve its relations with the U.S., and thus acquire the long-blocked U.S. military aid. Peace, as its own reward, would clearly enhance Jordan's security. King Hussein would have a secure and delineated western border. Since Israel would henceforth have a vital interest in Jordan's stability, Hussein would be able to relieve the pressure from its more powerful neighbor on its western flank. Because of its interest in maintaining stability in Hashemite Jordan, Israel could be expected to make an

⁵⁶ *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, 87--94.

⁵⁷ *Strategic Survey 1992-1993*, 109-119.

⁵⁸ *Strategic Survey 1993-1994*, 130-135.

effort to protect it from regional pressures. It might do everything possible, especially meeting Jordan's defensive needs, to strengthen its neighbor.⁵⁹

C. THE PEACE DIVIDEND AND PERILIOUS PROSPECTS

In the 1980s U.S. military aid to Jordan averaged \$60 million a year. During 1991-1993 it was \$17 million.⁶⁰ Since the peace agreement, Jordan's military relations with the U.S. have improved considerably in recent years.⁶¹ The U.S. has forgiven Jordan's \$275 million Foreign Military Funding (FMF) debt and increased military aid. The Clinton Administration requested \$18.8 million worth of U.S. aid to Jordan in FY 1994. It requested \$15.5 million worth of U.S. military aid for Jordan in FY 1995, and demanded \$38.4 million worth of U.S. military aid for Jordan in FY 1996.⁶²

The recognition of Jordan's strategic importance on the peace process, and on a variety of fronts, including vis-à-vis Iraq resulted in more U.S. military commitment to Jordan. Because of Jordan's strategic position in a troubled region, the United States has an interest in a stronger Jordanian military. A stronger Jordanian military would be better able to implement the UN sanctions. As a result, sixteen F-16 fighter aircrafts, which had been continuously demanded by King Hussein for a long time, transferred to the Jordanian military⁶³. The U.S. military aid also upgraded an airfield near Iraq. Providing F-16s to Jordan at that time also facilitated combined operations between the two

⁵⁹ *Strategic Survey 1994-1995*, 128-131.

⁶⁰ Patrick Clawson and Zoe Danon Gedal, *Dollars and Diplomacy: The Impact of U.S. Economic Initiatives on Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999), 35.

⁶¹ For detailed information, see US Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998," Department of Defense, Washington, 1998.

⁶² Cordesman, *Perilous Prospects*, 26. "The Clinton Administration sought \$999 million in debt forgiveness in 1994, with the rest of the debt to be canceled over the next two years. The Congress barely approved the program, slowed down the initial rate of forgiveness and full debt forgiveness would not take place until 1996." Cordesman refers to *Jane's Defense Weekly*, July 12, 1995, 19.

⁶³ *The Military Balance, 1999/2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS), 134-137.

countries' air forces. Upgrading Jordanian weaponry and logistical infrastructure could have been one of the most effective ways to improve the readiness of a friendly Arab military to operate alongside the United States during a regional crisis. Moreover, U.S. security assistance may also have reinforced the Jordanian military's willingness to work with Israel. Unlike the cold peace with Egypt, Israel's peace with Jordan involved extensive military-to-military contacts. Jordan held informal talks with Israel about cooperative efforts on weapon system overhaul and maintenance. Jordan was also repositioning its land forces to improve coverage of the Iraqi and Syrian borders and a lighter force to cover its border with Israel. Talks were under way between Israel on cooperative border surveillance.⁶⁴ It even became possible to cooperate with Israel in dealing with other regional threats such as terrorism. This had led Jordan to establish strong liaison groups with Israel on security issues—avoiding the use of force and supporting third parties—and to cooperate in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS).⁶⁵

In this case, U.S. military aid is certainly going to play an important role in the future of the peace process. There is a broad consensus that U.S. military aid to Jordan will play a critical role in ensuring the stability of the peace process. Something close to the levels of aid to Israel will probably be needed for half a decade or more simply to underpin the current peace agreement.⁶⁶

Given the fact that "alliances are the most binding obligations in international politics,"⁶⁷ the flow of U.S. military aid is not only a guarantor of Jordan's political

⁶⁴ Clawson and Gedal, 33-39, 40, 63.

⁶⁵ Cordesman, *Perilous Prospects*, 189.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶⁷ Robert E. Osgood, "The Nature of Alliances," in Kaufman, McKittrick, and Leney, ed., 65.

future, but it also assures of the Hashemite survival. The declaration of Jordan as a U.S. non-NATO ally was particularly important as a sign of strong political support for Hashemite Jordan. It also deterred the military intentions against Jordan.⁶⁸

Yet purely strategic considerations might not address the internal sources of instability in Jordan.⁶⁹ For a weak state, like Jordan, "internal security is sometimes a more important function of alliance."⁷⁰ In recognition of international significance of domestic threats and developments, which are often supported covertly from outside, the resumption of an alliance with the U.S. may be intended principally to enhance the stability of the Hashemite regime.⁷¹

Even though military aid is an effective way to balance external threats, it can do little to produce effective solutions to domestic problems. Political and economical developments—democratization and liberalization—may exacerbate the internal problems of Jordan. Domestic problems, if not addressed, can be a threat to the survival of the Hashemite monarchy and to the U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East. Thus, it remained to be seen whether Hussein could omnibalance the internal threats by shifting Jordan's alignment in the peace process.

Islamic fundamentalism, reinforced by Palestinian rejectionism, might openly oppose pro-Western security policies. This discontent may challenge the Hashemite foreign policy. Because of domestic resistance, the regime cannot overtly embrace or

⁶⁸Risa Brooks, *Adelphi Paper 324: Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, (London: IISS, 1998), 28-31.

⁶⁹Lieber, 69, 77.

⁷⁰Walt, 173.

⁷¹Osgood, 66.

take a reluctant stance to be part of a pro-Western regional security system or "mini NATO,"⁷² including Turkey, Israel, and possibly Egypt.⁷³

Before the peace, security issues such as the military budget, defense policy, recruitment, weapons acquisitions, and deployment were virtually taboo topic. But, military cooperation with Israel and the United States in the wake of the peace treaty has become an issue of public controversy inside of Jordan. In this regard, the January 1998 invitation to join Israeli-Turkish naval exercises led to one of the first public debates on security-related issues in the history of Jordan.⁷⁴

Jordan's rapprochement with the new Turkish-Israeli axis, together with its acquiescence to U.S. policy toward Iraq, may cause internal discontent in Jordan. The domestic opposition might even challenge Jordan's broader security relations.⁷⁵ In addition to this, Jordanian involvement in the emerging security system might face regional resentment.⁷⁶ This might bring new external threats for Hashemite Jordan's security equation.

Nonetheless, Hussein's decisions seemed to be largely autonomous from domestic forces. Jordan's interests were based on "objective considerations of power, strategy, and

⁷² This specific term was entitled by the former Secretary of State Alexander Haig. See Nitza Nachmias, *Transfer of Arms, Leverage, and Peace in the Middle East*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988), 6. The author refers to Amos Perlmutter, "Reagan's Middle East Policy: A Year One Assessment," *Orbis* (Spring 1984), 26-29.

⁷³ "Don't Smother Abdullah," *The Jerusalem Post*, 12 February Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/ (Jordan and Military and Cooperation and Arms Transfer). [16 February 1999].

⁷⁴ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 205-215.

⁷⁵ The peace paved the way for Jordan to broaden its international security. See David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliances New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 75, 89, 245, 265.

⁷⁶ *Xinhua News Agency*, "Realignment Goes in the Middle East," 10 January 1999, Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/ (Jordan and Military and Cooperation and Arms Transfer). [16 February 1999]. Daniel Pipes, "The Real 'New Middle East'," *Commentary* 106, no.5 (NY: The Library Institute of Human Relations, Nov 1998), 25-29. Gil Dibner, "My Enemy's Enemy," *Harvard International Review* 21, no.1, (Cambridge: Winter 1998/1999), 34-39.

security, not on the transient passions of citizenry." Hashemite "foreign policy [in the peace process] was based on objective considerations of the national interest derived from international structure." In the Hussein era, "the course of domestic political debates would less likely effect foreign policy, precisely because of the relative autonomy of the state and the systemic derivation of the national interest."⁷⁷

The decision to make peace and realignment with the U.S. were steps taken not merely by King Hussein. They were the policies of "deeply rooted political-military establishment" in Jordan.⁷⁸ These policies were indirectly aimed to bolster the pro-Hashemite orientation of military. To put it more bluntly, the U.S. arms were not only a simple utility of national security but they were also the symbol of political commitment to the post-peace, and perhaps post-Hussein, status quo in Jordan.⁷⁹

However, the dangers for the regime stability still exist in Jordan. In the third chapter, I argue that external alignment might not adequately omnibalance the internal threats. Quiet the contrary, it may involve certain risks. The fact that the Hashemites have successfully managed political-military relations in the past does not mean that they

⁷⁷ Lynch, *State Interests*, 9-23.

⁷⁸ Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 32, no.1, (February 1999): 100-129. See also Samir A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1-18.

⁷⁹ For a detailed discussion see U.S. Congress House Committee on International Relations, "Arms Transfers to Jordan and Consideration of the Committee's Views and Estimates for the Fiscal Year 1997 Budget Resolution," (Hearing and Business Meeting before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 13 March 1996).

will do so in the future. Maintaining this control is a continuous and evolving process. Past success does not guarantee future stability. Therefore, the regime's survival cannot be taken for granted in Jordan.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Brooks, 9-11, 73-75.

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III. PEACE AND DOMESTIC FACTORS: THE INTERNAL SIDE OF THREAT AND SECURITY

Strategic significance led not only Jordan's establishment as a modern state, but also to its survival.¹ The artificial creation and evolution of Jordan is closely linked to the roots of regime security predicament.² At this point, one should be reminded that the "Amirate of Transjordan," today's "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," emerged because of "European colonial interests after the First World War. It was a threshold to survival and perhaps to a greater power for Hashemites."³ Yet, "Transjordan could not survive without British aid."⁴

Accordingly, external rent has become main part of the Hashemite's governing formula. Therefore, the state evolved as "rentier—primarily a distributor or an allocator rather than an extractor of resources from within." The allocator-recipient relationship between the state and the citizenry has resulted in an autonomous state and an apolitical citizenry. The state had focused on foreign policy to collect funds that enabled it to continue to play its allocative role, a role that underpinned the regime itself.⁵

¹ Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 64-66, 81-83.

² For more information about the problem of artificiality and its negative impact on regime security and foreign policy, see Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 11-15, and Mohammed Ayoob, "Unraveling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World," in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, (NY: St. Martins Press, 1993), 31-36.

³ Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 40-60. Hashemites are believed to have "belonged to a noble Arab family, which traced its descent from the Prophet Muhammad...It was this primordial claim, being thirty-seventh in the line of descent that made the Hashemites the guardian of the Holy Places in the Hijaz and fostered their ambition for an independent Arab kingdom." See also Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1987), 20-40.

⁴ P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957*, (NY: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, 1967), 1-12.

⁵ Brand, 64-73, 81-83.

Jordan's "aid addiction" started from its early existence. So, it was not surprising that the Hashemites had wanted to obtain new weaponry for the military, and also had desired to secure a deal for up to \$1 billion debt relief for the troublesome economy.⁶ Not just external and military concerns were to be addressed by the peace, but all-time regime—domestic and mostly economic—security problematic was to be resolved.

After making peace with Israel, Jordan received considerable amount of U.S. military aid and enhanced its military capabilities.⁷ As a result, the Hashemite regime balanced the external threats within a relatively short time. Simply put, the change in alignment brought external security to Jordan. Nonetheless, it remained to be seen whether this change could be sufficient to balance the internal threat in Jordan. Even in the pre-peace period, the question was critical because the internal threat had been effective in defining the regime's alignment choice in the Gulf War. This very recent episode showed that Hashemites' domestic balance of threat calculations could also be central while choosing sides. The case of omnibalancing proved not to be a unique and a passing phenomenon for the monarchy. At this juncture, the traditional security concerns and external arguments are not sufficient to explain the relationship between the internal threat, the regime security and the alignment choice. Realizing this fact, in the first section of this chapter, I will analyze the political origins of the internal threat. Secondly, I will explain the economic dimension of the regime security in Jordan. Lastly, having looked at the overall domestic balance in post-peace Jordan, I argue that politico-military and socio-economic stability are key to Hashemite survival. Therefore, a careful

⁶ Ibid., 295-302.

⁷ See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1998," <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_ac/wmeat98/wmeat98.html>, [17 February 2000], (Data as of 14 January 2000).

exploration of pre and post-peace domestic developments is necessary to understand the relationship between the internal threat and regime security in Jordan. This may also be essential to predict Hashemites' foreign policy orientation in the post-Hussein era.

A. DEMOCRATIC LIBERALIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN JORDAN

Domestic political and economic balancing along communal lines has formed the main part of Hashemite rule in Jordan. In this context, the monarch had focused on Transjordanian/Palestinian split and the public/private sector divide. Calculating the sociopolitical underpinnings, the regime created a relatively stable domestic balance of power in Jordan by reinforcing the sectoral division with the communal cleavage. But, the picture changed when the Hashemite regime was faced with a severe debt crisis in the late 1980s. The fiscal crisis destabilized the domestic balance of power in Jordan. As a result, the monarchy had to undertake economic reforms. Thus, it entered into a structural-adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the end of 1988. By January 1989, the regime had to cut its budget and raised revenues domestically.⁸ Cutting the budget threatened the Transjordanian bureaucracy and army while raising the revenues threatened the largely Palestinian businessmen. The regime was no longer capable of providing its traditional "political and economic bargain." The Transjordanian public sector perceived the structural adjustment program—the cutting of government subsidies—as the weakening of their "special relationship" with the Hashemite monarchy. To them, Palestinians were "making money." The implementation of IMF-requested austerity measures exploded in riots in 1989. The riots

⁸ Curtis R. Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Money Fund," *Middle East Policy*, vol. 6, no.2, (October 1998), 54-66.

and ensuing clashes of Transjordanian (East Bank/Bedouin) communities shook the regime. The traditional basis of regime security was threatened in Jordan. Responding to the most serious challenge to his rule in nearly twenty years, King Hussein reacted by launching a process of democratization.⁹ Interestingly enough, this “pre-emptive liberalization strategy” created an unexpectedly strong and an Islamist opposition against the Hashemite regime. Most important, the salience of “Islamism”¹⁰ increased with the developments in the peace process.

From very early on, like all other democratic transitions, providing a political and economic balance between “losers and winners” created a “puzzle” for the Hashemite regime. King Hussein used different strategies—like the convocation of elections, the manipulation electoral law, and the tactical voting—to solve the puzzle. Nevertheless, his solutions to the deep-seated communal conflict did not cover all cleavages and fell short of addressing the drafted problem. On the contrary, it created both conflict and mobilization. Given these conditions, what would be the political outcome in Jordan? There could be no hard-and-fast answer to this question.¹¹

For the Hashemite regime, first and foremost, the “question was whether the transitional costs would be tolerated by both economic and political losers.” Therefore it had to find a “balance between the winners and the losers.” At this point, “the issues of economic and political transition were not separate from each other. The tensions in the economy pose a direct threat to the democratization. During the transition period, if the

⁹ Brand, 64-73, 284-295. Glenn E. Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30, (1998): 387-404.

¹⁰ Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 132. In his overview Robinson suggests that “Islamism” is often *inappropriately* called “Islamic Fundamentalism.”

¹¹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10-14, 39-42, 49-56, 59-64.

regime cannot provide a balance of power between the domestic forces it might find itself in very delicate situations. At this fragile moment, the losers may even risk the survival of the regime.”¹² Both political and economical reactions may force the regime to vacillate between appeasement and containment or take both strategies simultaneously in order to provide a balance between the winners and losers.¹³ Nonetheless, because of the inherent uncertainty of democratic transition, “it is not possible to specify *a priori* how specific social sectors will interpret these strategies.”¹⁴

Unlike most Middle Eastern regimes, the Hashemites of Jordan tried to manage the liberalization process by leaving a margin of political expression for Islamists in the wake of nationwide food riots in April 1989, in which eleven people were killed. Hussein’s inclusionary policy reflected a realization that the old model of the regime control over political and economic affairs could not be maintained without some degree of pluralism. The monarchy was also certain that it could retain the ability to curtail undesirable outcomes.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the King did not permit political parties to campaign in the elections of 1989. All candidates stood as independents with one exception. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was allowed to run not as a political party but as a charity

¹² Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 28, 65-72.

¹³ Przeworski, x-xii, 14, 22-29, 33-46, 139.

¹⁴ O’Donnell and Schmitter, 27-39.

¹⁵ Ibrahim A. Karawan, *Adelphi Paper 314: The Islamist Impasse*, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 33-36. Generally speaking “other Middle Eastern regimes did not want to include Islamists in the formal political process either because allowing them to compete unrestricted was seen as a threat to the existing order.”

organization. Pro-government candidates won 35 of the 80 seats. The MB secured 20 and other Islamists 14 of a total 45 opposition seats in the Parliament.¹⁶

Political liberalization did not bring the intended positive result. As far as the economy was concerned, "things were going bad to worse. The economic situation was so bad that renewed and spontaneous outbreaks of social unrest could not be ruled out. Rising unemployment, high inflation and frozen salaries faced the general populace. There was still bread to eat (due to subsidies), but few other comforts. With public resentment over corruption, and with little economic improvement the political situation remained explosive."¹⁷

Coming on the heels of the elections, the Gulf Crisis offered a unique opportunity for the "fledgling democrats," to test their ability to mobilize support and thus solidify and enlarge their constituencies.¹⁸ The Islamist opposition was in a better position to express its support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because of the economic decline and its impact on the traditional bases of regime support. The Islamists took the advantages. The "pragmatic Islamists" got a lot out of this decisive moment. King Hussein had few options. By 1990, the regime security had a much more important domestic component. The Gulf Crisis marked perhaps the greatest challenge for Hashemites in the kingdom's

¹⁶ M. E. Yapp, *The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995*, (NY: Longman, 1996), 472.

¹⁷ Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics," *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, no.2, July 1997, 7. Page number refers to the printed copy. [Available Online]: (http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_27.htm). Kanovsky quotes from *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan," no.1, (1990), 4.

¹⁸ Daniel Brumberg, "Islamic Fundamentalism, Democracy and the Gulf War," in James Piscatori ed., *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, (Chicago, IL: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), 187.

history—two prior occasions: the 1956 Baghdad Pact debacle and the Black September of 1970.¹⁹

The antipathy of the Islamist movement toward the West, especially the United States, was exacerbated by the deployment of coalition forces in the Gulf. The primary reaction of Islamist discourse turned into a popular sentiment of outrage. The Islamists urged the King to side openly with Iraq in the war. More radicals even went further declaring “jihad” against “the Zionists and the imperialists.”²⁰

During the Gulf War, anti-Western and anti-Zionist passions were effectively addressed by the Islamist discourse. Political Islam used institutional channels as the Parliament and Cabinet to mobilize the people. In addition, Islamists took the advantages of their own religious and organizational structures. By the way, the measures of austerity have further strengthened their hands. Under these circumstances, supporting anti-Iraqi forces had political risks. Given the sociopolitical connection that sustains the regime, strongly Islamist and largely Palestinian opposition could easily be an extremely sensitive issue.²¹

Simply put, pro-Iraqi domestic opposition during the war endangered regime security in Jordan. Hence, the King was forced to allow the Islamists a considerable amount of access to political power. This was seen in the cabinet changes of January 1991. With these appointments seven of twenty-five Ministers were from the Islamists. It might appear that the King neutralized the power of the Islamists through the type of

¹⁹ Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations*, 284-295.

²⁰ Beverly Milton-Edwards, “A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan,” in Piscatori ed., 88-99.

²¹ Malik Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.32, no.1, (February 1999): 100-129. [Available Online]: <<http://proquest.umic.com/>>. Hereafter I used the page numbers on the printed copy as my reference.

ministerial appointments. On the contrary, rather than the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Information, and State, the Islamists themselves requested the appointments to the Ministries of Education, Religious Affairs, and Social Development. They desired these types of ministries knowing that this would give them a high domestic profile. They could use their positions to provide grassroots support. The fact that the Islamists held these particular positions after the Gulf crisis did give them another advantage. Following the outbreak of war, the Islamists intensified their efforts in the task of "awakening people." The MB also "established special organizations to collect medical supplies, food stuff, and financial donations" to provide help to the Iraqis. In addition to its own structures the Islamist movement was able to use the mosque to rally public support further with its "own time-honored anti-American ideology." The increasing number of rallies and marches occurring after Friday prayers testified to the success of Islamists in exploiting the crisis.²²

Owing to his precarious situation, Hussein bandwagoned with Iraq. The economic consequences of siding with Iraq were dire. The U.S. suspended its economic aid program. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut off all aid to Jordan, which had been \$1.2 billion in the early 1980s and was still a substantial amount of \$500 million by 1989. The UN sanctions had an adverse effect on Jordan's economy as well. Jordan had been an important route for the transit of goods—most importantly oil—to and from Iraq. Iraq was also a major buyer of Jordanian products. In the short run, possibly the most difficult blow was the mass expulsion of Palestinian workers (around 300,000), who were Jordanian citizens, from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.²³ Most important, in the shortage of

²² Edwards, 100-107.

²³ Kanovsky, 8.

financial assistance, it would be extremely difficult to prevent massive defections from the army and security services.²⁴

So, the post-Gulf War period remained a troubled one for Jordan and its monarch. Dependent upon the U.S. for vital economic and military assistance, King Hussein had to attempt to repair his poor relations with the United States. Urged by the U.S. to take a decisive stand in favor of a peace conference with Israel, he could afford to alienate neither Washington nor the people on his own streets. Many Islamists were vehemently opposing any negotiations with Israel. Particularly, they were resentful of what appeared to be heavy-handed U.S. pressure. Like other political actors in the Gulf crisis, the Islamist movement in Jordan had expressed its own ideas about the post-war regional and internal order. The prominent feature of its plans was the overwhelming desire to manufacture an exclusively Arab-Muslim solution. It wanted to increase levels of Arab Muslim cooperation and, more importantly, exclude the West from playing any part in determining the future of the Middle East. Muslims and Arabs were encouraged to unite to build "a new international order [which would be] free from American hegemony, [and be] more just and equitable." In response to such ferment, the King circumscribed the power of the Islamists by approving the National Charter.²⁵

In the deliberations leading to the Charter, ratified in June 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood accepted the principle of strict allegiance to the monarchy. But, the political discourse showed different results. As some younger Islamists became critical of the King's policies in the peace process, the regime tightened political restrictions.²⁶ The

²⁴ Brand, 64-73, 284-295.

²⁵ Edwards, 100-107. See also Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 77.

²⁶ Karawan, 33-36.

Islamist movement was the only significant power in Jordan that has strongly opposed the normalization of relations with Israel. Consequently, the monarchy had to undermine the Islamist opposition, which had long been its counterweight to more feared leftist and more radical groups in Jordan. From this time on, King Hussein had started to undertake significant steps to contain the MB, and later its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The "Old Guard" understood that they had to stay within the parameters defined by the regime. But, some of them, especially younger Islamists, continued their opposition. Interestingly enough, they were the ones who had been championing the democracy. As one would-be loser put it genuinely: "They had to know how to play the balancing game." Yet, even the low level of resistance was viewed as dangerous by the regime. In view of that, Hussein initiated a new party law and a process of electoral change.²⁷

The regime's gerrymandering had promised to provide the anticipated result that was the "tribal parliament." The monarchy became largely successful, as the results of elections in 1993 demonstrated. Nonetheless, knowing that the electoral changes would work in favor of certain cleavages, the Islamists also played the tribal card. The likely losers also did well in an electoral system clearly designed to work against their interests. The Islamists won more than a quarter of all parliamentary seats. The success of MB was intimately linked to the Palestinian issue. The IAF did best in heavily Palestinian areas. Furthermore, the electoral success suggested that the MB and the IAF remained the best

²⁷ Robinson, "Defensive Democratization," 394-396. "With the new party law, the monarchy could forbid any party from outside ties, i.e. Palestinian. If the king had wanted to close down any of the parties this would have provided him with legal justification. The new law excluded non-Jordanians from participating in political life, laying the groundwork for Palestinians to choose to be Jordanian citizens."

organized non-governmental grass-roots institution in Jordan. Such organization allowed them to mobilize support in ways other parties could not match.²⁸

Viewing all of the possibilities of a growing political threat, Hussein realized that democratization has gained movement of its own and therefore became dangerous for regime security. First, he put more limitations on the liberalization process. Then, he tried to divide and balance the opposition. As a result, the splits in the IAF began to appear between social and political Islamists and along the Palestinian-East Bank divide as well. Additionally, tensions between the hard-liners and soft-liners emerged. By taking advantage of the internal differences the regime prevented the formation of a cohesive and united opposition front. Thus, by shaping both the structure and the internal dynamics of the opposition, the monarchy safeguarded its power base. The success of the Hashemite regime was the result of its ability to apply a range of methods—coercion and co-optation—to tackle the domestic challenge.²⁹

In terms of the domestic economy, unemployment was still high, ranging between 15-20 percent. A social disparity was growing, with a tiny rich elite living in enormous mansions, surrounded by increasing poverty. As a result, between 1991 and 1994, the regime decided to increase the public sector employment to 15 percent and the real (inflation adjusted) wage by 40 percent. Nevertheless, this policy could only be detrimental to long-term economic security.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid., 397-400.

²⁹ Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 373-387. See also Karawan, 23-27.

³⁰ Kanovsky, 9. The author refers to *Economic Intelligence Unit*, "Quarterly Economic Review-Jordan Third Quarter," (1996), 13; *The New York Times*, 30 June 1996.

In order not to fall a similar trap like in the Gulf War, the regime attempted to prevent the possibility of a crisis on foreign policy. With the implementation of the new electoral law, Hussein sought a more compliant parliament in 1993 elections not to jeopardize the peace process.³¹ Even though their representation had dropped considerably, the Islamist opposition to the peace process did continue until the signing of the peace treaty. They boycotted U.S. President Bill Clinton's address to the Jordanian parliament on the occasion of the signing. King Hussein signed the peace treaty on 26 October 1994 despite the Islamists' opposition. The IAF continued its opposition in the aftermath of the peace agreement. Yet, on 6 November 1994 the treaty was ratified by a vote of 55 to 23.³²

Obviously, the empirical evidence would suggest that Hussein could not ignore the internal threat while making the decision to seek peace. He was smart enough to recognize that the peace process would increase domestic instability. But he thought that the short-term benefits of peace was so great³³—which would primarily affect the military and security services—that they would certainly be enough to bring regime security. More than anything, he would have the necessary means to balance the internal threat. Speaking of liberalization, democracy could also be “balanced” in pursue of peace. As being an authoritarian ruler, King Hussein had “all the cards in his hands.” He has not conducted politics. He has “*been* politics.” Not only could he “establish rules that prohibit actions that would lead to undesirable outcomes, but he could also overturn

³¹ Edwards, 106.

³² Mufti, 14.

³³ Anderson, 25-35. Before the peace President Clinton had promised that the U.S. would work with other countries to tackle Jordan's \$16 billion foreign debt. Anderson refers to *Middle East International*, no. 460 (8 October 1993).

such outcomes even if they result from following his own rules.” Basically, democratization in Jordan has involved “*more* of forces associated with the authoritarian regime and *less* of the civil society.”³⁴ Political liberalization “has been directed from the beginning by the Hashemite regime to strengthen its position in society.”³⁵ Until the signing of the peace treaty, the regime had skillfully managed to shape and to control the political outcome to its favor by various tactics.³⁶

So far, the losers were not able to create “fissures” on the Hashemite “power bloc.” However, like all other cases, democratic transition in Jordan generated incentives for the civic forces to remove the guarantees left as the authoritarian legacy, which is inherently unstable. Regime “interests is not a given priori” for the losers. Thus, especially in the long run, the Islamist opposition cannot be taken for granted in Jordan. Even the very limited uncertainty inherent in democratization is a threat for regime security. In Jordan, at least some form of autonomous organization would not be repressed. Therefore, the political security of the Hashemite regime for the post-peace period is not evident given the uncertainties of democratization and the strong impact of political economy over the “irreconcilable division of society.” In other words, the persistent strength of Islamic movement and its large Palestinian presence may result in different types of outcomes in a period of economic hardship and volatile identity politics. Especially in the long run, democratization process offers hope to the losers. If the losers do not opportunities they may well become the new winners in the future.³⁷

³⁴ Przeworski, 22-46, 66-68, 88-98.

³⁵ Robinson, “Defensive Democratization,” 400-404.

³⁶ O’Donnell and Schmitter, 9, 66-72.

³⁷ Przeworski, 11-19, 46-56, 79-86, 180. Robinson, “Defensive Democratization,” 403, 404. Mufti, 100-129.

The Hashemite regime can "keep the balance of power with its twists and turns...Current position in the political system does not guarantee future victories. Incumbency may be an advantage, but incumbents do lose."³⁸

B. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE DEEPENING ISLAMIZATION OF JORDANIAN SOCIETY

Since its early existence, religion has been widely used by the Hashemite regime and became very much instrumental in giving legitimacy to its actions. Therefore, religion and politics became intimately connected in Jordan. More recently, perhaps because of this intertwined relationship, religion provided a frame of reference and an institutional structure for domestic opposition. Islam contributed significantly to both the ideological and the institutional axes according to which regime and opposition played themselves out in the society. "By appealing to religious ideology and utilizing socioeconomic institutions and programs, particularly those that target the poor, the political Islam attempted to gain greater access to the masses and through them access to power." In the case of Jordan, it also became apparent that "support for the political Islam is closely associated with opposition to the peace process." What is the basis of support for political Islam and rejection of peace with Israel? Is it political or religious? We can extrapolate and ask: Do the political Islamists in Jordan really aim to challenge the established foreign policy of the Hashemite regime?³⁹

³⁸ Przeworski, 47, 48.

³⁹ Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey, "Islam and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol.42, no.5, (October 1998): 619-636. [Available Online]: <<http://proquest.umicom/>>. See also Mufti, 12. He quotes from the IAF's 1993 election pamphlet: "Our struggle with the Jews is a doctrinal struggle, a cultural struggle which will not be ended by the peace treaties; it is a struggle of existence and not of borders."

All of these questions beget a more important question: "Who are the Islamists in Jordan?" Are they a loose coalition of "counter-elite," composed of alienated businessmen and professionals, a second stratum of frustrated intellectuals and unemployed or underemployed university graduates? Asked another way, are they largely political and economic losers?⁴⁰

In Jordan, there are a number of reasons why Islamists have gained power in the last decade. Factors having to do with Islam itself are important but not sufficient to explain the deepening Islamization of Jordanian society. More than anything, the deteriorating economic and political conditions led ordinary citizens to support political Islam. They believed political Islamists were best able to put pressure on the regime. In this instance, the political vacuum that exists in the authoritarian regime gave the Islamist movement the organizational and institutional advantages. At the grassroots level, by carrying out an extensive array of welfare and development activities, political Islam gained support especially in poorer neighborhoods.⁴¹

During the 1990s, Jordanian society witnessed declining resources, governmental retrenchment, and non-credible economic reform efforts. The economic downturn together with administrative deficiencies and government spending cut-backs tattered the social safety-net. Under these social and economical circumstances, the Islamist opposition found a political base to exploit. In short, the policies of the Hashemite

⁴⁰ Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State*, 132-136. See also Alan Richards, "Toward a Political Economy of Islamism: Grievances and Collective Action," (Unpublished Manuscript, April 1995), 1-14.

⁴¹ Ibrahim A. Karawan, *Adelphi Paper 314: The Islamist Impasse*, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 5, 13.

regime during the last decade have fostered an Islamist opposition, which would include alienated businessmen and professionals, frustrated youth, and the urban poor.⁴²

The deepening Islamization of Jordanian society in recent years was primarily because of the failures of the Hashemite regime in its economic and political projects. Given these conditions, political Islamists pursued two key strategies to achieve their interests. First, they established socio-economic institutions (schools, clinics and day-care centers). By using social work they exploited inadequate welfare provisions. In this way they hoped to demonstrate their capabilities, to increase popular support and to undermine the political legitimacy of the state. Secondly, political Islamists used elections as a means to expand their constituency and mobilize support for their stance against the status quo. They took part in elections whenever possible, even when no change in the country's political leadership had been expected.⁴³

Precisely the same scenario had been executed by the Islamists in Jordan. They used political liberalization and economic reform both "strategically and tactically" in order to achieve their organizational and political interests. By appealing religious ideology, they demanded major policy changes in the economy and foreign policy. Most important of all was the opposition to the economic reform and to the peace process. By so doing they could challenge the domestic balance of power in Jordan and threaten the foreign policy of the Hashemite regime.⁴⁴

Until the signing of the peace treaty, King Hussein had managed to balance the Islamist opposition with various tactics. But, this time since the political liberalization

⁴² Robinson, 132-136. See also Richards, 1-14.

⁴³ Karawan, 16-23.

⁴⁴ Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 373-374.

and economic reform unfolded against the backdrop of the peace process the balancing act became especially difficult. Pursuing peace while simultaneously hedging against its risks further complicated the King's balancing act. Unlike the earlier occasions, in which the king had skillfully balanced internal threats, the current period might prove an even greater challenge to the Hashemite regime. Now, the King had to play the balancing act in two axes. One axis had to balance the Transjordanian public sector versus the Palestinian private sector. The other had to balance the "King's Men"—the Transjordanian/Palestinian elite—against the Islamists. This was the key to preserving the domestic stability. The task was made more difficult by the need to balance dangerous external forces. The peace process presented a grave challenge for the King.⁴⁵

On the one hand Hussein had recognized that peace, and almost eventual "abandonment of Iraq" were necessary for both regional stability and external security. Moreover, peace would dramatically increase foreign aid and might also promote strong private investment. On the other hand, there were domestic political dangers. Both policies would possibly face serious challenges from Islamists. Here, the real danger might also appear. Since they constituted the only force that would give hope to the "losers" regardless of the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide, Islamists might play a particularly important role in uniting the opposition along class lines regardless of identity cleavages. At this juncture there were two main and interrelated questions. The first one was how far could Hussein proceed with the liberalization process without increasing intercommunal or socio-economic tensions? Secondly, how could his foreign

⁴⁵ Democratic Institutions Support Project (DIS), "Political Economy Review of Jordan," 4 November 1993, prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development by Cheonics International, 13-20.

policy affect domestic stability? Having undertaken limited political liberalization and economic reform sufficient to stabilize the economy, the King proceeded with the peace process, as he planned. No political group was allowed to obstruct the key foreign policy initiative of the King. Peace was a "regional and international imperative." Economic and political liberalization in Jordan was real and important, but its limitations had to be recognized. Nevertheless, Islamists tried to exploit even the limited political opportunity mostly by playing the "anti-peace" and "pro-Iraqi" rhetoric.⁴⁶

Given these conditions, Islamists might attract substantial portions of the "economic losers" along with those who felt alienated from the regime by the political process. Even though the "construction of the foreign threat and its public sphere deployment" seemed useful for the regime,⁴⁷ the "widening gap between rich and poor, high rates of unemployment, inflation, and other socio-economic ills" could not be addressed by these conventional security calculations.⁴⁸ It seemed easier for Islamists to bridge the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide among the lower classes because of the shared economic suffering. However, this might not have been sufficient to challenge the regime. If the King failed to continue "divide and balance," the Islamists would form an alliance with the upper elements of Transjordanian state sector."⁴⁹

In the weeks after the signing of the peace treaty, the ingredients for domestic upheaval—outpouring of hostility, widespread demonstrations and rioting—did not exist. Indeed, although the regime did keep a close eye on these matters. Even in the following

⁴⁶ Ibid., 40-44. See also Alan Cowell, "Mideast in Flux: Fiasco in Jordan Strains Old Links," *The New York Times*, October 17, 1997.

⁴⁷ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 71-94, 103-106.

⁴⁸ Kanovsky, 9.

⁴⁹ DIS, 13-20, 40-44. See also Laurie A. Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 115-120.

years, however, it was still too early to judge accurately the concrete benefits or long-term consequences of peace for Jordan. One had to wait and see. Contrary to the expectations, quick and dramatic economic benefits did not occur. For some, therefore, disappointment set in quickly. While others, i.e. the Islamists, who were already opposed to the peace treaty thought that their predictions had come true. For many in the heavily Palestinian private sector, there was a reluctance to engage in business dealings. In contrast to the support of many top financiers and commercial elites, many professional associations, dominated by the Islamists, made clear their displeasure with the treaty rejecting the opening of any professional dealings with their Israeli counterparts. The situation in the public sector was different. Plans had already been drawn up for ambitious development schemes and joint ventures.⁵⁰

Despite these grand economic plans, opposition to the treaty continued to make itself heard within a relatively open domestic atmosphere. But the government response to the Islamists began to test the level of the liberalization and democratization process itself. The most dramatic episode, in this context, was the arrest of (not for the first time) of the outspoken Islamist leader, Layth Shubaylat. But as in a previous episode (in 1992-1993) the attempt by the government to silence Shubaylat served only to amplify his voice. Shubaylat attacked not only the peace treaty and normalization of relations with Israel, but also the regime's abandonment policy of the former ally, Iraq. He also criticized the regime's "overt embrace of closer strategic partnership with the United States." So having achieved the peace treaty, King Hussein felt the need to replace the Prime Minister Majali with the same man who had preceded him, his cousin and former

⁵⁰ Curtis Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process," in Ilan Peleg ed., *The Middle East Peace Process*, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998), 169-174.

Field Marshall, Shakir. His caretaker role was the result of a need to ensure order during the transition. Within a relatively short period of time, by February 1996, Jordan had a new Prime Minister. Kabariti and his new cabinet were announced with the emphasis of a "new era." In addition to furthering economic reform, the Kabariti government was charged with pursuing exactly the same policies that the Islamist opposition rejected: deepening the political and economic relationship with Israel as well as the strategic alliance with the United States, while distancing the kingdom from Iraq.⁵¹

C. HASHEMITE REGIME SECURITY IN POST-PEACE JORDAN

Idealistically, almost everyone had believed that peace, by its very nature, would bring economic prosperity to Jordan and conditions would be better. In reality, this did not happen. The major economic gain Jordan obtained from its peace agreement with Israel was the cancellation of the \$705 million debt to the US. This was followed by the cancellation of debts totaling \$90 million to UK, \$53 million to Germany and \$4.5 million to France. The main goal of peace, namely attracting substantial foreign private investment and improving regional trade and tourism, did not materialized. Because of the "hegemonic dominance" of Israel's economy, the "feeling of many in Jordan seemed that they were no better off today because of peace and may be even worse off" tomorrow. In other words, the immediate period after the peace demonstrated that change in foreign policy and the subsequent alignment could not eliminate some of the domestic threats. Instead of "trying to milk the cow of peace" Hashemites of Jordan had "to streamline their own economy. They had to take more drastic measures internally to improve the economy. The peace agreement could contribute only marginally to

⁵¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 607-620.

economic problems. The crucial economic issues were largely domestic in origin and therefore required, more than anything else, far-reaching changes in domestic economic policies.”⁵²

Beside these economic downturns there were political and social dangers as well. Among them, “the Palestinian trauma”⁵³ loomed large as a question of regime security for the post-peace era. The interpretation of peace by the Palestinian majority was definitely important. Given the political and socioeconomic components of the East Bank Jordanian-Palestinian cleavage the peace could lead to a radical nationalism in the political discourse. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the impact of the political-military balance should not be underestimated. The short-term benefits seemed to be enough to keep the armed forces satisfied and loyal to the Hashemite monarchy. But, was the military going to be acquiescent within the domestic status quo of post-peace Jordan? Beside all of these unknowns, the question of succession became critical in the mid-1990s. Could the successor create a personal legitimacy close to Hussein’s so that the transition could go smoothly?

1. State Interests and Identity Crisis

It should be remembered that the demographic weight of Palestinians has never been accorded proportional representation in the institutions of Hashemite regime. Although they were a majority, traditionally there have been few Palestinians in the upper decisionmaking echelons. Because of their relative exclusion in the machinery of the

⁵² Kanovsky, 10. The author refers to *Middle East Economic Digest*, (5 January 1996), 10; (25 October 1992), 2; *The Middle East*, (October 1996), 20, 21; (September 1994), 22-24; *Financial Times*, (4 April 1995), 7.

⁵³ Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 209-219.

state, the Palestinians were not really fully integrated as Jordanians in the society. Therefore, Palestinian-Jordanian relationship has hardly ever been smooth. After the Palestinian uprising (intifada), which had begun in the Occupied Territories, this relationship became even more complex. Israeli policies toward the "Jordan is Palestine" formula and the "Alternative Homeland" option clearly presented a fundamental challenge to the Hashemite regime. By 1988, one year after the intifada, King Hussein perceived an existential threat emanating from the claim to the West Bank. He believed that severing of ties would best protect Jordan from that threat. This was the first step to make Jordan a "real nation state." The Jordanization of the state redefined regime's foreign policy interests in the peace process. The most important example has been the shift from opposing to supporting the creation of Palestinian state. By developing a sharp distinction between the Palestinian issue and the question of Palestinians living in Jordan, the regime attempted to separate foreign policy from domestic politics. However, when the decision was foisted upon society, it showed complicated results. In order to address domestic challenges for its foreign policy the regime tried to use the identity threats both strategically and tactically. It became a rational strategy for the regime to ethnicize the polity to a certain point in order to prevent the political mobilization along class or ideological lines. The role of the monarchy deserved more attention in this respect. By serving as balancer between the various groups, the Palace has often manipulated

tensions and mistrust between communal groups in order to prevent the consolidation of a united popular opposition.⁵⁴

Above all, the regime justified its foreign policy on Jordanian interests, not Palestinian interests. The removal of the issues of refugees from the Jordanian political agenda was the leading example. Jordan like, "all states," had to look out for its own "survival first." But when the King asserted that peace serves Jordanian interests, many citizens of Palestinian origin responded: "the interests of which Jordanians?" They did not want to accept the peace treaty with Israel. As a result regime and society clashed over the peace. The treaty had become so unpopular that one would even suspect that peace might not survive in the absence of domestic support.⁵⁵

Generally speaking, the signing of the peace treaty generated a negative response in the society. During the period after the treaty, the regime and the opposition figures engaged in spirited and open debate. The opposition resisted all forms of normalization with Israel. It prevented the institutionalization of the peace in civil society. So, peace was institutionalized only at the state level. After failing to win the earlier rounds of public debate, the regime eventually found itself facing a hostile popular will. The "Resistance"—"a semi-permanent coalition of Islamists, leftists, Arab nationalists, and Jordanian nationalists"—defended an image of Jordan as an "Arabist State." On the other hand, the regime identified itself with the "Peace Camp." "Israel, from this

⁵⁴ Asher Susser, "The Palestinians in Jordan: Demographic Majority," in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor ed., *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999), 91-99; Mark Lynch, "Jordan's Competing Nationalisms: Deliberation, Transition, and Theories of Ethnic Conflict," (Williamstown, MA: 17 November 1998, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, 6 December 1998), 1-19; Linda L. Layne, *Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 96-105. Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 94-105.

⁵⁵ Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 1-8, 22-24, 63- 65, 165-170, 198-204, 215-225.

perspective, represented no particular threat, while Syria and Iraq required great vigilance. The Resistance insisted that Israel remained the greatest threat to Jordanian and Arab security. They even went further presenting alternative foreign policy, which would entail reorientation toward Arabism, Iraq and Syria, and away from the United States and Israel. Bluntly put, the regime was unable to explain its position after the peace in the public sphere."⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the monarchy continued to carry out the peace process despite public opposition. Contrary to most predictions, the Palestinian-Jordanian relations did not incite danger. But the political arena again polarized over the peace process. This time divisions emerged between Jordanian factions. Nationalism became increasingly salient. Radical nationalists threatened the regime in the 1990s more than did Palestinian mobilization. The bedrock linkage between the Hashemite regime and tribes gave the signs of strain in two consecutive uprisings. Within their strong political and socio-economic component,⁵⁷ the riots of 1996 and 1998 should also be perceived as major indicators of polarization of society over state interests and of domestic instability emanating from identity crisis.⁵⁸

2. Political and Military Stability

The events of August 1996 and February 1998 struck deep into the political and social system. On both occasions, it seemed that the government could not guarantee the internal stability. King Hussein, who had proved to be adept at managing political-

⁵⁶ Ibid., 165-170, 198-204, 215-225.

⁵⁷ Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots," 54-66.

⁵⁸ Lynch, "Jordan's Competing Nationalisms," 1-19. Riots are generally accepted as major indicators of regime *instability*. See Bruce M. Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics*, (San Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1974), 56-58. He refers to Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

military relations, needed the support of the army in order to restore stability. Only the assertion of military power could provide regime security. Consequently, the army controlled the riots. This showed that the military has remained a key force in Jordan.⁵⁹ Because of that, one can easily single out the Hashemite regime as an example of firmly entrenched political control over the military. Therefore how this control is maintained, and whether it will persist is particularly important.⁶⁰

In the case of Jordan, one could argue that the army created the state. The army was a vehicle of nation building. Initially tasked with the creation of a state, later on, the army had matured into an instrument for maintaining stability. Its primary task became to protect the Hashemite dynasty, from internal as well as external threats. Therefore, the monarch in Jordan did pay special attention to the needs and problems of the military.⁶¹

In the process of maintaining the dynasty's tenuous position, like his grandfather, Hussein's strategy was based upon having a dependable and faithful patron and a strong and cohesive military. The latter was the major benefactor of former. Hashemite Jordan survived with military assistance from mainly Britain and later the United States. Hussein also took a close interest in military affairs and cultivated the armed forces. In

⁵⁹ Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 250-253.

⁶⁰ Risa Brooks, *Adelphi Paper 324: Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 9-18, 30-32.

⁶¹ "The British built for Abdullah the ultimate prop of his regime—the Arab Legion—more than twenty five years preceding the emergence of Jordan...While Jordan has been an independent sovereign state only since 1946, its military dates back to 1921." See P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957*, (NY: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, 1967), 1-12. See also Helen Chapin Metz ed., *Jordan: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1989), 238-242.

light of his military training and qualifications as a jet pilot, he was keenly interested in top military appointments and in materiel purchases.⁶²

To provide cohesiveness in the military Hussein heavily relied on East Bank tribes at the expense of the Palestinian majority. East Bankers, and especially the Bedouin, have formed the backbone of the army combat units. The preferential enlistment of the Bedouin not only provided poor people with career opportunities, but it also served to consolidate the legitimacy of the state and to create a patron-client relationship, characterized as the "quintessential monarchical/tribal-military axis." In Jordan, top military appointments were almost exclusively based on family links. Many of Hussein's relatives occupied pivotal positions in the military. The leading example was his son Prince Abdullah, who headed the Special Operations Command, which includes the Royal Guard.⁶³

As long as the regime was certain about the loyalty of its coercive apparatus, no one could challenge the Hashemite dynasty and everything would be fine. The influence of the army in the face of communal tensions constituted one of King Hussein's greatest strengths. Beyond everything, "the political-military balance was at the core of his policies."⁶⁴ In this case, anecdotal evidence would also suggest that the peace might be aimed to relieve military's dissatisfaction over foreign policy, especially dealignment

⁶² John B. Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, (NY: Harpers & Brothers Publishers, 1958), 360-370. See also Robert B. Satloff, "The Jekyll-and-Hyde Origins of the U.S.-Jordanian Strategic Relationship," in David W. Lesch ed., *The Middle East and the United States: Historical and Political Reassessment*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 119-124, and Metz, 223-240.

⁶³ Brooks, 31-33, 70.

⁶⁴ Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), 183-185. According to Brand, historically, there have been three sources of threat to the throne: the army (1957), a broad coalition of East and West Bankers (1955-56), and the Palestinians with some East Bank allies (1968-71).

from the U.S. in the Gulf War.⁶⁵ In this context, US military assistance indirectly bolstered King Hussein's regime, while potentially reinforcing pro-Western sentiment among the military. It also gave the military a vested interest in the peace with Israel, which was also in parallel to Hashemite's survival interests. Solidifying the support of military has been essential for King Hussein to retain office during the most controversial, and perhaps the most challenging decade in his reign. In Jordan, the recent turbulent periods in political, social and economic conditions suggested that political-military relations could again be important for regime survival. But one point is not clear yet. Is peace enough for the Hashemite regime to sustain the acquiescence of military? In the long run, if and when some kind of unhappiness grows in the military, the delicate political-military balance in the Hashemite kingdom may deteriorate. Very much interrelated to the political-military balance leadership succession may present another challenge. Particularly, relations between the aspiring leader and the armed forces become critical for the transition period.⁶⁶

3. Succession and Personal Legitimacy

King Hussein's hospitalization in mid-July 1998 for cancer treatment created concerns about Jordan's leadership succession. Against the backdrop of social discontent, the military's apparent support for the Hashemites offered reassurance that the succession would be smooth. At the same time, however, maintaining this support would cause a subtle shift in the regime's political-military balance. Hussein's use of repression since the mid-1990s—a restrictive press law, a less representative electoral law, and the adoption of more intrusive internal-security measures—had increased the regime's

⁶⁵ Hussein, King of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, (New York: Bernard Geis, 1962), 104.

⁶⁶ Brooks, 9-11, 28-31.

reliance on the military and security forces. Under these circumstances, "Abdullah's military credentials" seemed to play an important role in King Hussein's last minute calculations.⁶⁷

Given the post-peace domestic realities, Hashemite political power appeared not to be a consensual one. The regime could not prevent social mobilization that has penetrated the sectors of potential counter-elite development. Therefore, the only possible conclusion seemed that the regime could only survive by coercion. However, two factors might mitigate otherwise praetorian conditions. While the personal legitimacy of a new king might have positive impacts, the external crises could complicate a situation. The most important of all, the prospects for Hashemite legitimacy and survival still rests on the personal skills of the king that would enable him to play an omnibalancing game in domestic politics as well as foreign policy.⁶⁸

Hussein's personal abilities were key to regime survival in Jordan. After having eight months of military education at the British Royal Military Academy, Hussein assumed the Hashemite throne at the age of eighteen. He had a kingdom with no capability—economic and military power—to act in the international arena. Only personal leadership could make the difference in Jordan's mere existence. Diplomacy became the integral part of Hussein's political power. His indefatigable and indomitable will to survive had impressed many of the American politicians. To Washington, nothing succeeds like success, and Hussein succeeded in surviving all the crises, either external or domestic. During his reign he proved capable of balancing the various domestic, regional and international forces that he had faced. Sometimes he lost, but his actions made him

⁶⁷ Ibid., 65-70.

⁶⁸ Hudson, 209-219.

generally deserve U.S. support. First President Eisenhower admired the young monarch's spunk in fighting for his throne and hosted him at the White House. Thereby he inaugurated a tradition that has been maintained through peace and war, with every U.S. president ever since. As long as Hussein was willing to fight, the United States offered modest help.⁶⁹

Moreover, Hussein personally was successful in creating a favorable image as being a gentleman—honest, decent, and reasonable. These qualities made him earn more respect in the Western capitals. This was about all he had, as a personal asset.⁷⁰ In the words of former Secretary of State James A. Baker:

As a friend of the United States, he brought extraordinarily able stewardship to his fragile country in a region of conflict and instability... Through the years King Hussein paid a price, in terms of opposition from the radical, pan-Arab regimes, for his close political and military relationships with the United States...He acted with foresight and determination in the best interests of Jordan and of peace and stability in the Middle East.⁷¹

On February 7, 1999, King Hussein died. As Jordan passes from the Hussein era to the Abdullah era, the strength of the monarchy will be put to the test. The good news is Abdullah was reputedly known as "a chip off the old block," in terms of dynamic personality, intelligence, and charm. His greatest competence is the support he enjoys in the armed forces and the security establishment. Still, Hashemite Jordan has never been a one-man show. The cohesion of the civilian elite, who are mostly motivated by self-interest in preserving their political patrimony, is important to domestic stability. Any

⁶⁹ Satloff, 122-125.

⁷⁰ Richard B. Parker, *The United States and King Hussein*, in Lesch ed., 110,111.

⁷¹ "First Test of Post-Hussein Jordan," *The Houston Chronicle Publishing Company*, 8 February Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/(Jordan and Military and Cooperation and Arms Transfer). [16 February 1999].

kind of inter-Hashemite rivalry may completely damage the unity of the "king's men." Beyond everything, Abdullah's international legitimacy, or more correctly the continued interests and support of external powers, mainly the U.S., will certainly define the kingdom's future.⁷² In other words, the ascension of Abdullah to the throne offers danger as well as opportunity. King Abdullah will be most comfortable with military interests that the peace provides, because of his dependency on external supporters—the United States and Israel.⁷³ However, by just focusing on external and military considerations, he may or may not steer the country through the stormy weather. Yet, there is one opportunity for him, perhaps not to be missed. Sound economic reforms and a return to political liberalization and engagement with the society offers greater prospects for long-

⁷² Asher Susser, "Succession Success," *The New Republic*, 22 February 1999, 16, 17.

⁷³ Wright, Robin. "U. S. Seeks International Help To Protect Stability of Jordan." *Bergen Record Corp.*, 7 February 1999. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/ (Jordan and Regional Security and Stability and Defense). [16 February 1999]. "U. S. Delivers Military Equipment to Jordan." *Xinhua News Agency*, 29 January Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/90DAYS/ (Jordan and Military and Cooperation and Arms Transfer). [16 February 1999]. See also "Arms Transfers Tables; Significant Recent International Transfers of Defense Goods and Services in 1998." *International Media Corporation Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy*. November, 1998 / December 1998. Available [Online]: LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/TOPNWS/2WEEK/ (Jordan and Arms Transfers and Defense). [16 February 1999].

term stability in Jordan and thus for the peace process.⁷⁴ This way he may ease the paradox of regime legitimacy, which is more apparent in post-peace Jordan.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ "Political liberalization and movement toward democracy would have consequences not only for the domestic politics...but also...for the evolution of...the Arab-Israeli conflict." See Mark Tessler and Marilyn Grobschmidt, "Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Garnham and Tessler, ed., 139, 140. See also Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 270.

⁷⁵ "Political liberalization and movement toward democracy would have consequences not only for the domestic politics...but also...for the evolution of...the Arab-Israeli conflict." See Mark Tessler and Marilyn Grobschmidt, "Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Garnham and Tessler, ed., 139, 140. See also Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 270.

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IV. CONCLUSION

In the case of Jordan, theoretically, the omnibalancing model proves to be applicable. It is also not too provocative to accept, even for the most students of Middle Eastern affairs, who are largely predisposed by geostrategic calculations. This is true because of the apparent evidence that the Hashemite decision in the Gulf War was, to a large extent, directed towards "home consumption."¹ Therefore, one has every reason to believe that the decision to make peace could also be a part of the regime's, rather than the state's, survival strategy. Including Hashemite Jordan, for most Middle Eastern regimes,

"...both war and peace have served as important devices to garner infusions of revenues from the international system and thereby purchase continuing political control at home...As a result both war and peace have been less conditions than instruments of patronage politics by other means...Both war and peace have been policy options pursued because they promise to produce a bounty for the regimes...Decisions to wage war or sue for peace are less likely to reflect assessment of long-term shifts in the international and regional balances of power than the calculations of short-term changes in the fortunes of regimes...From this perspective, war and peace share far more attributes than they exhibit differences. They are not goals to be sought or avoided in themselves, but instruments used in the service of other goals..."²

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 369. Kissinger states that for King Hussein the major imperative was the survival of his dynasty. In his words, King Hussein "...was no cynic, and he had great faith in the United States, never straying beyond the point that might jeopardize his American safety net...The only time King Hussein came close to it was during the Gulf War of 1991 when he refused to join the anti-Saddam coalition, though I would make the argument that the survival of his dynasty was perhaps the most important service Hussein could have rendered to Middle East stability in that crisis."

² Lisa Anderson, "Peace and Democracy in the Middle East: The Constraints of Soft Budgets," *Journal of International Affairs*, 49, no.1, (1995): 25-35. See for a more recent and case specific study of her, "Democratization and Foreign Policy in the Arab World: The Domestic Origins of the Jordanian and Algerian Alliances in the 1991 Gulf War," in M. Kahler ed., *Liberalization and Foreign Policy*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), 121-142.

For the scholars of international relations the message is costly. But, at the same time, it is clear and convincing. As far as the comparativists are concerned, it is not an all-alien argument. The more interesting for them is the impact of foreign policy in domestic politics. In this case, "foreign policy very often represents a heavy load for a regime...A disloyal opposition can easily blame" the regime rather than external constraints. "The process of international negotiation" may "lead to contradictory and ambiguous positions" between the regime and society.³ Most important, it becomes arguably true that since it was not made by a stable political system, peace is less likely to hold.⁴

Given the similar conditions like the Gulf War, one could suspect that foreign policy may easily be exploited by domestic opposition and might again be a source of challenge to regime survival in the post-peace era. If and when an internal threat increases one should be ready for a new case of omnibalancing behavior. At that time, depending on the degree of internal to regime survival, it is not going to be so dubious to expect a change in Hashemite foreign policy in the peace process and a new choice of alignment. In this realm, "the international system, which is a critical determinant of any state survival, does not give clear guidance to the search for regime-specific developments."⁵ It must always be kept in mind that the domestic component of regime security showed its strength over Hashemite foreign policy. For future policy analyses, it

³ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 43.

⁴ Zeev Maoz, "Domestic Political Violence, Structural Constraints, and Enduring Rivalries in the Middle East, 1948-1988," in David Garnham and Mark Tessler, ed., *Democracy, War, and the Peace in the Middle East*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 188, 189.

⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*, (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990), 9, 10.

becomes almost a necessity to more closely examine the dynamic relationship between internal threat and alignment choice in Jordan.

Despite these theoretical findings, there was a good case to be defended by “traditionalist viewers of international relations.” Jordan’s inferior land and air forces needed extensive upgrading, especially after the end of the Gulf War. Could Jordan hope to deter Israel, Syria, and potentially Iraq? Could Jordan acquire a reasonable level of security toward Syria and Iraq if it made peace with Israel? Finally, what policy would be the most stabilizing for Jordan externally? Hussein decided that peace with Israel would enable Jordan to realign with U.S. and provide it access to advanced weaponry. This in turn would allow the kingdom to focus on a still potentially hostile Syria and Iraq. Thus, Jordan could achieve the ultimate goal of survival. From this perspective, “Hussein is rightly credited with having made Jordan a viable state in the international arena.”

On the other hand, there was an equally good case to be made by the “interpreters of a new security paradigm.” Given the importance of military in the domestic balance of power, Hussein desperately needed the confidence of the military to restore stability in the political system. The monarch had to ensure that the military had enough stake in the preservation of Hashemite throne. Such an urgent move towards peace was essential to underpin the regime. In this view, forging methods other than a societal consensus has been, and thus most likely will be, the dominant form of political discourse in Jordan between the state and the society. Undoubtedly, Hussein left a socio-politically “weakening state” to his son, Abdullah.

Abdullah has to face this fact. He should be ready to respond to any kind of confrontation with the opposition. At every juncture, his ability to "assess the mood of his subjects and the efficacy of his security services" will be tested. In a very timely and orderly fashion, he must skillfully calculate every risk before moving any further.⁶ Abdullah ought to find a more conclusive technique, in order to solve the security problematic—socio-economic conflict and political disorder—for good.⁷ Otherwise, the very survival of Hashemite dynasty will always be on the brink.

In the future, Hashemite survival will be more vulnerable to an internal threat. General economic conditions are key in defining the parameters of confrontation between the post-succession regime and the opposition in Jordan. Abdullah has to take a lesson from economic history: "outside aid can contribute marginally to economic improvement." If only Abdullah adopts and efficiently implements wise economic policies, the people of Jordan can prosper. The crucial economic issues and problems facing him are largely of domestic origin. They require, more than anything else, far-reaching changes in domestic economic policies. As the August 1996 and the February 1998 crises had shown, "aid for peace deal" contributed little or nothing toward the removal of internal social and economic obstacles. Instead, it "engendered false expectations and dangerous disappointments."⁸

Empirical evidence suggests that the Islamist threat has proven not to be a passing phenomenon in Jordan. Hence, in the future, political Islam is going to be a challenge for

⁶ Mariam Shahin, "Long Live the King," *Middle East*, no. 288, (March 1999): 5, 6.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-6, 208-218.

⁸ Eliyahu Kanovsky, "The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International Politics," *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, no. 2, (July 1997). See also The World Bank, *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998).

the already fragile regime legitimacy. Especially under dire socio-economic conditions, the risk of subversive broad political coalition shall not be ruled out in Jordan. It seems highly unlikely that Palestinians, comprising over half of Jordan, alone could bring about important changes in the political system. Indeed, many of them are unwilling to challenge the status quo, for the fact that the majority of them have been doing well economically and acquired a real stake in the continued stability of the Hashemite regime. Some Palestinians, however, especially refugee-camp dwellers (about 20 percent of the total refugee population and some 10 percent of the total Palestinian population in Jordan) are still reluctant to renounce their affiliation to Palestine.⁹

Given this reality, what would be most feared is the kind of broad coalition that unites the disgruntled elements from both banks.¹⁰ Like the one in the mid-1950s, the opposition coalition of the mid-1990s had presented such a threatening case. The Islamist mobilization, which led the Resistance, had been comprised of both the discontented Palestinian origin Jordanians and the disenchanted East Bankers.¹¹ This caused Hussein to accuse the Resistance of "having a Palestinian face, of being controlled by Syria and Iraq, and of being the tool of Islamic fundamentalist radicals controlled from abroad"

⁹ Asher Susser, "The Palestinians in Jordan: Demographic Majority," in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor ed., *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1999), 103. Susser refers to Laurie Brand, "In the Beginning Was the State...: The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan," in Augustus Richard Norton ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1995), 144-153.

¹⁰ Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1988), 183-185. Brand asserts that "historically there have been three sources of threat to the throne: the army (1957), a broad coalition of East and West Bankers (1955-56), and the Palestinians with some East Bank allies (1968-71)."

¹¹ Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 30, (1998): 399-402. Robinson states that the outspoken Islamist opposition leader Layth Shubaylat "hails from a prominent East Bank family, so he could not be easily be dismissed by the regime."

(read Iran). But, this did not work out to convince the society on regime's "strategic vision of foreign policy."¹²

Since the sources of opposition have not been eradicated the "Islamists will most likely continue to capitalize on the policy failures and pose diverse challenges to the existing order" in Jordan. They must be taken seriously. The opposition is ready and able to immediately exploit foreign policy "rhetorically." This means that Islamist challenge to the peace will not "vanish or whither away."

Just the opposite, the internal threat suggests strong implications for the normalization of relations with Israel. By looking at the formation of political economy in Jordan, it might not be surprising that domestic opposition to normalization might easily cause a "cold peace." "Economic security" concerns of both the regime and the society are still critical in the post-Hussein era. If economic reforms put extra pressure on the general populace, the chances of domestic instability will rise again. Economic problems will also lead to deepening of the splits in the conception of national identity. At that time, the Hashemites cannot escape the political uncertainties. Increased manipulation of ethno/religious politics and bitter personal rivalries may create serious disrespect for the regime. Abdullah, like his father, seems to be determined to fight. But, whether he is able to balance the internal threat only with international alignment policies remains ambiguous.

In Hussein's absence, despite pessimist predictions, the Hashemite regime has survived the first year. So far, the monarchy has managed to resist the determined efforts of various politicized elements. But, especially in a period of volatile identity politics,

¹² Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 200-223, 230-253.

there still remains one major threat—a fissure inside the ruling civilian and military elite—that can challenge the dynastic legitimacy in Jordan. Therefore, for the post-peace and post-Hussein regime survival the factor of “elite cohesion” seems crucial.

Abdullah cannot afford to ignore this threat. First and foremost, the members of this elite, a “strategic minority” or “community of thrust,” must share “the same confessional, ethnic characteristics and even the same regional and provincial background.” Maintaining the cohesion of this core group is central for Abdullah’s survival.¹³ In addition, the regime has to ensure efficient control over the military and the security agencies. Controlling the primary repository of force and the main instruments of coercion have always been vital for the survival of the monarchy in Jordan. King Abdullah, who had gained an upper hand over the armed forces, has to “secure the vested interest of the military in the status quo.” It is true that the Hashemite dynasty has successfully managed political-military relations in the past. But this does not mean that it will happen automatically in the future.¹⁴ For this reason, the stability of the Hashemite regime should not be taken for granted.

Another mistake for the new King would be to ignore public opinion. The public sphere offers an opportunity to nurture a societal consensus and to secure a legitimate place for the new regime. The justification of foreign policy in society could be essential to relieve the family’s acute “legitimacy” problem in fully achieving “the task of nation-

¹³ Ibrahim A. Karawan, *Adelphi Paper 314: The Islamist Impasse*, (London: The International Institute Strategic Studies, 1997), 30-37. He quotes from Charles Tripp, “Islam and the State in the Middle East,” *Ethnic Studies Report*, vol.13, no.2, July 1995, 181, 182.

¹⁴ Risa Brooks, *Adelphi Paper 324: Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, (London: The International Institute Strategic Studies, 1998), 9-20, 40-44. Laurie A. Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 115-120.

building.”¹⁵ This is so because “any definition of state interests still rests on a definition of national identity in relation to the Palestinians living in Jordan.”¹⁶ “Security threats based on identity cannot be addressed by purchasing more guns. Instead, it largely depends on the regime’s ability to present a more convincing identity claim.” Hashemites “have both to convincingly present a Jordanian identity and to reconcile the place of Palestinians in Jordan without denying the political reality of the Palestinian identity.”¹⁷ Efforts toward creating a viable economy and a modern society may be helpful for Abdullah to defend convincingly the definition of national interest with regard to the peace process.

After all of the dust settles, Abdullah must also consider the possible negative impacts of normalization on certain sectors of society in Jordan. As a result of economic interactions there will be invariably winners and losers. The losers do not accept defeat gracefully. They can frequently cause considerable trouble within the society, even if the overall consequences are deemed to be positive. Hence the new king has to be ready for new types of *disorder*. He had better pay careful attention to the answers of this question: Who are the new winners and losers in *the political economy of the peace process*?¹⁸

¹⁵ Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 209-219.

¹⁶ Lynch, *State Interests*, 1-8, 22-24, 63-65, 165-170, 198-204, 215-225.

¹⁷ Rashid I. Khalidi, “Palestinians and a New King,” *The New York Times*, February 11, 1999. According to Khalidi, “As long as the status of Palestine is in limbo, the situation will remain unstable, with the majority of Jordan’s citizens living in constant tension with the Hashemite regime.” See also Ilana Kass and Bard O’Neill, *The Deadly Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian Rejectionism on the Peace Process*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997).

¹⁸ This subject material is part of a current research project and a forthcoming book by Glenn E. Robinson. Dr. Robinson is associate professor of Middle East studies at the Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, and research associate at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

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